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Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran:
Shifting the Burden of Proof on Factual
Causation
By Allan Favish*
Since 1945, the United States Government has conducted over
six hundred announced nuclear detonations.1 The great majority of
these tests have taken place at the Nevada Test Site, with over one
hundred and twenty of these Nevada detonations occurring in the
atmosphere.2 In 1951, the Department of Defense (DOD) began
troop maneuvers in conjunction with many of these tests. Although
the last of these "atomic war games" was conducted in 1962, only
recently have the circumstances surrounding the testing been dis-
closed.3 The facts are coming to light as a result of the difficulties
* B.A., 1977, University of California, Los Angeles. Member, Third Year Class. Many of
the documents cited in this Note are on file with the Hastings Law Journal.
1. Effect of Radiation on Human Health-Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 333 (1978) (statement of Dr. Donald
M. Kerr) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
2. Low Level Radiation Effects on Health: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66, 343 (1979) (statement of Mahlon E. Gates) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Hearings]. See also 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 341-67 (detailed list of announced
United States nuclear detonations, including name, date, location, type, purpose, and yield);
1979 Hearings, supra, at 111-41 (a similar but more recent list of announced United States
nuclear detonations). Approximately 105 detonations took place in the Marshall Islands,
while the remaining tests were at other locations, including tests off the San Diego coast in
1955 and 1962. See Noyes, O'Neill & Weir, Operation Wigwam, NEw WEST, Dec. 1, 1980, at
25; New York Times, Dec. 16, 1979, at 72, col. 4; id., May 12, 1962, at 9, col. 2; id., May 18,
1955, at 11, col. 3; id., May 12, 1955, at 5, col. 1; id., May 10, 1955, at 1, col. 3 (details of San
Diego tests).
According to recently declassified documents, the Nevada Test Site was intended to
handle "a few relatively low-order detonations" and then "only in the event of an emer-
gency." Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1978, at A12, col. 4. President Truman's approval of the
site was given before the Army Corps of Engineers completed its studies on radiological
safety factors. Id.
3. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1; H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS (1980); M. UHL
& T. ENSIGN, G.I. GUINEA PIGs (1980); New York Times, June 20, 1979, at Al, col. 1; Huyghe
& Konissberg, Grim Legacy of Nuclear Testing, New York Times, Apr. 22, 1979, Magazine,
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which many veterans and their dependents are having in recover-
ing compensation for injury and death allegedly caused by radia-
tion encountered at these tests.4
While today's soldier may receive training for an atomic bat-
tlefield through the use of a simulated nuclear explosion,5 the DOD
wanted more than "simulation" in decades past. The military be-
lieved that actual nuclear explosions were necessary to accomplish
its goals of troop indoctrination and training and the enhancement
of public relations. The benefits of such maneuvers were seen on
two levels. First, individual soldiers would receive training that
would prepare them for a possible nuclear battlefield in the future.
Second, the participating troops could be studied as to their com-
bat performance and psychological reactions.'
at 34; Smith, Atomic Veterans, OMNI, Nov., 1980, at 14. Investigative reporter Paul Jacobs
wrote an insightful article, published in 1971, on the power and responsibilities of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which did not receive the attention it deserved. See Ja-
cobs, Precautions Are Being Taken By Those Who Know, THE ATLANTIc, Feb., 1971, at 45-
48, 53.
4. See Veterans' Claims for Disabilities from Nuclear Weapons Testing: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Cranston Hearings].
5. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 327 (statement of Major Alan Skerker, Dep't of
the Army).
6. A memorandum from the Military Liaison Committee of the AEC to the Chairman
of the AEC states: "Indoctrination in essential physical protective measures under simu-
lated combat conditions, and observation of the psychological effects of an atomic explosion
are reasons for this desired participation." Memorandum from Military Liaison Committee
to Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (July 16, 1951). A memorandum in reply gave
approval for troop participation. Memorandum from Chairman, Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, to Chairman, Military Liaison Committee (Aug. 3, 1951). Moreover, a letter from the
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to the AEC's Division of Military Application stated
the military's desire to "[o]ccupy a position at the time of detonation which is safe but not
beyond a distance from ground zero which is reasonably sound from a tactical standpoint,
and ... [m]aneuver in the vicinity of ground zero as soon as practicable after the explo-
sion." Letter from Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to Division of Military Applica-
tion of the Atomic Energy Commission (Mar. 7, 1952). A subsequent letter stated: "It is
emphasized that the Department of the Army desires to inject the maximum possible real-
ism into the exercise." Letter from Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to Division of
Military Application of the Atomic Energy Commission (Apr. 3, 1952).
The general who served as Exercise Director for the 1952 detonations concluded:
"From the military standpoint, the analysis of the psychological reaction of the participat-
ing troops is probably the most important angle of the Exercise." Armed Forces Talk, Sept.
19, 1952, at 10. A Marine Corps general participating in the same tests stated that the "tests
are especially valuable in demonstrating to the troops that the blast area does not necessa-
rily remain deadly and that men can attack soon after an air burst without physical harm."
Id. at 13. For details of psychological studies on troop reactions to atomic explosions, see
1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 244-48 (statement of Major Alan Skerker).
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The Army established Camp Desert Rock just outside the Ne-
vada Test Site in 1951. At least 80,000 troops from all parts of the
country participated in Desert Rock exercises over the next dec-
ade.7 According to an Army document," the atomic bombs ex-
ploded in conjunction with troop maneuvers were detonated under
a variety of circumstances. Bombs were suspended in the air by
balloons, were secured to huge steel towers, and were dropped
from airplanes. 9 The troops were positioned at distances varying
from twelve miles to just under one and a half miles from ground
zero,10 sometimes in trenches and other times not.1" After several
blasts, troops moved within a few hundred yards of ground zero
minutes after the detonation.'2 This advance would take place on
foot, and by jeep, tank, helicopter, and parachute.'" When they
were not assaulting a mock enemy, the troops might be examining
the remains of equipment placed only a few hundred yards from
ground zero,' 4 although on occasion the radiation was so intense
A Marine Corps report from 1955 analyzed the benefits of troop participation in atomic
detonations, reasoning: "[Tiroops were familiarized by realistic means with the passive de-
fense measures which serve to minimize or protect against the effects of an atomic explo-
sion. It served to remove apprehensions concerning the capability of the weapon. All hands
gained a high degree of appreciation of it3 power as well as its limitations and its proper
place in the family of weapons .... [The opportunity to conduct live monitoring exercises
provides splendid training available by no other means." Report of Exercise, Desert Rock
VI, Marine Corps, 3d Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, May 11, 1955, at
VII-1, VII-2. See generally M. UHL & T. ENSIGN, G.I. GUINEA PIoS 63-66 (1980).
An Army report from 1957 states that one objective of troop participation at a particu-
lar detonation called "Smoky" was to "portray to the public the Army at its best." Exercise
Desert Rock VII and VIII, Final Report of Operations, Nov. 25, 1957, at 36. The same re-
port describes the testing of troops to measure their ability to field-strip rifles and sweep
dummy minefields after witnessing an atomic explosion and to "navigate a combat course
and throw dummy grenades in radiologically contaminated terrain." Id. at 39. See generally
1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 263-65 (statement of Major Alan Skerker).
7. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPLIES TO QUESTIONS GIVEN TO DEFENSE REPRESENTAT-
TIVES BY THE SUCOMM. ON HEATH AND ENVIRONMENT, COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERcE, U.S. HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DESERT ROCK OPERATIONS, 95th Cong., 2d
Seas., Jan. 25, 1978, at Topic B-2 (completed in conjunction with 1978 Hearings, supra note
1, unpublished but on file with Subcommittee) [hereinafter cited as DOD REPLIES TO QUES-
TIONS]. According to the DOD, at least another 120,000 military personnel were present at
nuclear tests in the Pacific. However, a complete list of the military personnel present at
these tests is lacking. Id.
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that the troops were not permitted to advance as planned.15 It was
no secret that troops were participating in such maneuvers; much
of the activity was covered by the press.16
This Note examines the circumstances surrounding the radia-
tion exposure of these veterans. The Note first demonstrates that:
(1) both the pathological and genetic dangers of ionizing radia-
tion 7 were known in the 1950's and 1960's;18 (2) the Atomic En-
ergy Commission (AEC) delegated its responsibility for the safety
of the soldiers to the DOD, which then authorized levels of radia-
tion exposure in excess of levels recommended by the AEC's Divi-
sion of Biology and Medicine; 19 (3) the DOD's dosimetry program
was so inadequate that the precise levels of exposure will never be
known;20 (4) the soldiers were given inadequate protection;21 (5)
most of the soldiers were nonvolunteers and none were informed of
the hazards involved;22 and (6) there has been little or no medical
followup on these soldiers or their offspring, and many of their
records have been lost or destroyed.2
The Note next examines the administrative and legal entan-
glements that have effectively worked to deny relief to the many
15. Id. at 32, 37, 40-41, 67.
16. See, e.g., New York Times, Mar. 25, 1953, at 24, col. 6; id., May 2, 1952, at 1, col. 4;
id., Apr. 23, 1952, at 20, col. 1; id., Nov. 3, 1951, at 6, col. 2; id., Sept. 18, 1951, at 1, col. 5.
Other news organizations such as The Las Vegas Sun, Time, Newsweek, and the wire ser-
vices also carried reports of these maneuvers.
17. Ionizing radiation is electromagnetic energy that separates electrons from atoms.
When this separation occurs in a human cell, biological changes can occur within the cell.
The various forms of ionizing radiation, such as x-rays, gamma rays, beta rays, alpha rays,
and neutron radiation, contain different physical properties and energy levels. Therefore,
different measuring techniques and protection measures may be needed for each form of
ionizing radiation. The classic unit of radiation measurement is the roentgoen (r). When
referring to human radiation exposure, however, two other units are most commonly used:
the rad and the rem. The rad (radiation absorbed dose) is an expression of an amount of
radiation energy that one gram of a particular substance will absorb. The rem (roentgoen
equivalent man) is similar to the rad, but it takes account of the different physical proper-
ties and biological effectiveness of the various forms of ionizing radiation. See Low Level
Ionizing Radiation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Production
and the Subcomm. on Natural Resources and Environment of the House Comm. on Sci-
ence and Technology, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 334-36 (1979) (statement of Donald S. Fredrick-
son); J. GOFMAN & A. TAMPLIN, POISONED PowER 32, 45-48 (1979).
18. See notes 29-36 & accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 37-38 & accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 40-44 & accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 45-47 & accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 48-64 & accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 65-79 & accompanying text infra.
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veterans and their dependents who claim that participation in
these tests24 has caused cancer, genetic defects, and other health
problems. The Veterans Administration has denied the great ma-
jority of these claims, maintaining that there is no causal connec-
tion between the testing and these health problems.25 As a result, a
number of claimants have resorted to the federal courts for relief. 28
The Note concludes that because of the .unreasonable nature
of the government's conduct, the burden of proof to establish fac-
tual causation should be shifted from the claimants to the govern-
ment. It will be argued that such a shift is justified in these cases
in accordance with emerging principles of tort law which provide
that, under certain circumstances, when the causal link between an
innocent victim's injury and the unreasonable conduct of another
party is incapable of proof, then the burden of proof on factual
causation should be shifted. In these cases, the loss resulting from
failure of proof should fall on the negligent party rather than on
the innocent victim.2 7
24. For an example of veterans' testimony describing their presence at specific tests,
see 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 143-48, 491-92.
25. See notes 80-95 & accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 96-109 & accompanying text infra.
27. See notes 110-39 & accompanying text infra.
Although this Note is concerned primarily with the troops who participated in the Ne-
vada atomic explosions, much of the discussion is applicable to situations involving others
who were exposed to radiation from atmospheric nuclear explosions, notably, the civilians
who lived in the area surrounding the Nevada Test Site. See Allen v. United States, Civ.
No. C-79-515 (D. Utah, filed Aug. 30, 1979) (class action by civilians). See generally STAFF
OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2ND SEsS., "THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS," A REPORT ON
HEALTH EFFECTS OF Low LEVEL RADIATION SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS TESTING PROGRAM CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (Comm. Print 1980)
(report concludes that the AEC's desire to secure the nuclear weapons testing program took
precedence over the Commission's responsibility to protect the public's health and welfare);
Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Sub-
comm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Comm. and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 1979 Hear-
ings, supra note 2; Fadiman & Jacobson, The Downwind People, LIFE, June, 1980, at 32;
PEOPLE, Nov. 10, 1980, at 42; Chicago Tribune, Apr. 20, 1979, § 1, at 10, col. 1; id., Apr. 5,
1979, § 1, at 1, col. 1; id., Apr. 2, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 1; id., Apr. 1, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Los
Angeles Times, Apr. 20, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 4; New York Times, Apr. 20, 1979, at Al, col. 3;
id., Mar. 3, 1979, at 11, col. 1; id., Feb. 24, 1979, at 8, col. 6; id., Feb. 23, 1979, at A18, col. 1;
id., Feb. 15, 1979, at A15, col. 1; id., Feb. 4, 1979, § 1, at 21, col. 1; id., Jan. 8, 1979, at A16,
col. 4; Washington Post, June 20, 1979, at AS, col. 1; id., Apr. 19, 1979, at Al, col. 3; id., Dec.
10, 1978, at A2, col. 3. The military personnel who entered Hiroshima and Nagasaki soon
after the bombings were similarly exposed to such radiation. See generally Solomon, Naga-
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Historical Background of the Atomic Testing
Knowledge of Pathological and Genetic Hazards
At the time the government was exposing military personnel
and others2 s to radiation from nuclear detonations, scientific
knowledge about both the pathological and genetic hazards of ion-
izing radiation was substantial. Pathological hazards are those that
affect the individual exposed to the radiation. These hazards in-
clude many types of cancer, tumors, and other diseases, a number
of which have a latent period between the radiation exposure and
the full effects of the disease. Genetic hazards are those that affect
the offspring and future generations of the individual whose repro-
ductive cells have been exposed to radiation. Damage to the repro-
ductive cells can result in later generations of adversely affected
individuals.
The medical literature from past decades is filled with articles
that documented the causal relationship between radiation and
several forms of cancer.2 9 In 1956, the National Academy of Sci-
saki's Other Victims, the Growing Toll Among GI's Who Helped Clean Up, THE PROGRS-
sivE, July, 1979, at 21; Los Angeles Times, Aug. 1, 1979, § 1, at 11, col. 4; id., Aug. 5, 1970,
§ 2, at 5, col. 1; New York Times, June 9, 1979, at A14, col. 1; Washington Post, Aug. 12,
1980, at A14, col. 4. The military personnel who participated in the Pacific nuclear explo-
sions were also exposed to ionizing radiation. See generally 1978 Hearings, supra note 1.
28. See note 27 supra.
29. A 1931 article in the American Journal of Cancer reported "overwhelming evi-
dence" that luminous watch dial painters using radium paint had developed bone cancers
because of the radiation with which they worked. Martland, The Occurrence of Malignancy
in Radioactive Persons, 15 AM. J. CANCER 2435, 2509 (1931). See generally La Porte v.
United States Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935); Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 360
Ill. 407, 196 N.E. 485 (1935); Martland, Occupational Poisoning in Manufacture of Lumi-
nous Watch Dials, 92 J. A. M. A. 466 (1929). The article noted that undue external expo-
sure to gamma rays and x-rays can cause anemias, and internal exposure to alpha rays can
do the same. Martland, The Occurrence of Malignancy in Radioactive Persons, 15 Am. J.
CANCER 2435, 2511 (1931). A causal link between lung cancer and radioactive sources other
than radium was suggested. Id. The article also associated a multiplicity of diseases with
radiation, including various types of cancers, diseases of the blood and lymphatic systems,
and bone disorders. Id. at 2511-12. Dr. Martland speculated that doses of radiation too
small to detect may produce malignant changes over a long period of time, and concluded:
"Theoretically the exposure to, or the use of any radioactive substance that will increase the
normal radio-activity of the body is dangerous." Id. at 2513-14.
The American Journal of Cancer published an article in 1936 that reported an in-
crease in ovarian tumors and lymphatic cancer among irradiated mice. Furth & Furth, Neo-
plastic Diseases Produced in, Mice by General Irradiation with X-rays, 28 AM. J. CANCE
54, 64 (1936). A 1946 article discussed the higher incidence of leukemia among radiologists
in comparison with other physicians. Ulrich, The Incidence of Leukemia in Radiologists,
234 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 45 (1946). The article concluded that the statistics present "sub-
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ences published an extensive study of the causal relationship be-
tween atomic radiation and health hazards.30 A similar study by
stantial evidence that exposure to radiation is a potential cause of leukemia." Id. at 46.
Radioiology published an article in 1947 that documented cancer induction in laboratory
animals following injection and ingestion of radioactive isotopes. Brues, Finkel, & Lisco,
Carcinogenic Properties of Radioactive Fission Products and of Plutonium, 49 RADIOLOGY
361 (1947). Latency periods ranging from 135 to 506 days were observed. Id at 362. An
article in 1950 noted experimental work showing an increased incidence of leukemia in mice
exposed to radiation, and suggested that the increased incidence of leukemia in radiologists
might also result from exposure to radiation. March, Leukemia in Radiologists in a 20 Year
Period, 220 AM. J. MED. Sci. 282, 285 (1950).
Further evidence of the causal relationship between radiation and cancer was derived
from studying the effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The AEC sponsored
virtually all of the research (including the following three articles) on the Japanese survi-
vors; it is therefore likely that the AEC was aware of the details of such research. A 1951
article in Blood stated: "Although the data on the human [sic] are subject to criticism, the
consensus is that exposure to x-rays does increase the incidence of leukemia in man. Prelim-
inary indications reported from studies undertaken on the survivors of the atomic bombs at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, suggest that there is a substantial increase in the leuke-
mia incidence rate in the exposed population over that found in a comparable control
group." Furth, Recent Studies on the Etiology and Nature of Leukemia, 6 BLOOD 964, 971
(1951) (footnotes omitted). The article noted that x-rays, gamma rays, beta rays, and neu-
tron radiation can cause leukemia. Id. at 973. A 1952 article also discussed the increased
incidence of leukemia in the Japanese atomic bomb survivors, concluding that "[t]he con-
cept that radiation from the atomic bomb explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a
leukemogenic agent in man is supported." Folley, Borges & Yamawaki, Incidence of Leuke-
mia in Survivors of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, 13 AM. J. MED.
311, 321 (1952). The same article stated that the possibility of leukemia appearing at a later
date in those individuals who were more than 2,000 meters from ground zero should be
studied. Id. A 1954 article noted the period of several years between the Japanese explosions
and the full effects of the leukemias, stating that detection of leukemia in its early stages
was accomplished with routine blood examinations performed on the survivors. Lange,
Moloney & Yamawaki, Leukemia in Atomic Bomb Survivors, 9 BLOOD 574, 584 (1954). In
contrast, there was a significant lack of medical followup on the veterans exposed to nuclear
bomb radiation. See notes 68-79 & accompanying text infra.
A 1957 Science article reported that "[s]tudies of the incidence of leukemia among sur-
vivors of the atomic bomb bursts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki have established that ioniz-
ing radiations induce leukemia in man." Lewis, Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation, 125 Sci-
ENCE 965, 965 (1957) (footnotes omitted). The article also noted "the long period of time
which sometimes intervenes between irradiation and onset of leukemia." Id. at 970. The
article stated that the available evidence indicated that there was no threshold dose for
induction of leukemia, thus implying that there is no "safe" dose, below which leukemia
would not be induced. Id. Rather, the article hypothesized that the relationship between
radiation dose and leukemia was linear-the greater the dose, the greater the chance of
inducing leukemia; the smaller the dose, the smaller the chance of inducing leukemia. As
long as there is any radiation, there would be some chance of inducing leukemia. The article
also expressed the belief that there were individual differences in susceptibility to radiation-
induced leukemia. Id.
30. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE-NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE BIOLOGICAL
EFFEcTs OF ATOMIC RADIATION (summary report 1956), reprinted in The Nature of Radioac-
tive Fallout and Its Effects on Man: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Radiation
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the British Medical Research Council was published in 1956.31
Thus, by 1957, a significant portion of the scientific community
urged caution with regard to radiation. 2
of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1827 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as 1957 Hearings]. The report stated: "The occurrence of leukemia and aplastic anemia as
late sequelae of exposure to x-ray and radioactive substances was well documented in the
medical literature prior to 1937." Id. at 1881. The report further stated that "[tloday [1956]
no informed physician believes that exposure to ionizing radiation has either a beneficial or
stimulating effect on the blood," id. at 1883, and that "[a]ny degree of radiation exposure
should be avoided if possible." Id. at 1885. The report noted that "an increased incidence of
leukemia among survivors [of the Japanese atomic blasts] has been clearly established,"
citing a statistical analysis. Id. at 1886. Commenting on the effect of internally emitted radi-
ation on the lungs, the report noted that "[o]ne microgram of plutonium (or 0.06
microcuries) introduced into the mouse lung as an 'optimal' aerosol has proved toxic after a
few months resulting in bronchial metaplasia, cellular infiltrations, and fibrosis, and carci-
nomas appeared after a year." Id. at 1923.
The report discussed the possible existence of a threshold dose of internally emitted
radiation, below which no health effects would be induced, admitting "ignorance as to
whether there is a true threshold for such late effects as malignant tumors, and as to the
degree of variation in response to equally exposed individuals." Id. at 1926. In discussing the
effects on the blood that could result from a single exposure of radiation, the report noted
"the growing belief that there may not be threshold levels for radiation effects." Id. at 1890.
Doubt about the "threshold concept" was expressed "since inability to detect effects at
lower doses may only be a manifestation of inadequate criteria for effect." Id. at 1885 n.6.
31. MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNcm, THE HAZARDS TO MAN OF NUCLEAR AND ALLIED RADI-
ATIONS (1956), reprinted in 1957 Hearings, supra note 30, at 1539. This British report stated
that the cause and effect relationship between heavy radiation exposure over short periods
and leukemia was "beyond doubt." Id. at 1554. The report noted that delayed effects of
radiation exposure include severe anemia and leukemia. Id. at 1553. Among the Japanese
leukemia cases that occurred up through 1954, "[t]he average length of the period between
exposure to the bomb and the first appearance of symptoms was about 6 years." Id. at 1555.
The report stated a latency period of 20 years or more "usually elapses between the first
exposure to radiation and the clinical appearance of" cancerous tumors induced by radia-
tion. Id. at 1557. For those individuals exposed to radiation in their occupations receiving
small doses over many years, the report stated "it is not yet known" how their chances of
getting leukemia compare to those receiving heavy doses over a short term. Id.
Again referring to those individuals exposed to radiation in their occupations, the re-
port noted that radiation may cause a decline in the number of red cells, white cells, and
platelets, which can lead to severe degrees of anemia. Id. at 1560. In its discussion of lung
cancer, the report explained: "In theory. . . the inhalation of radioactive material in par-
ticulate form, either as a result of fall-out from nuclear weapon explosions or in the vicinity
of nuclear reactors, could lead to the accumulation of a high radiation dose within the lungs.
Such particles would not be uniformly distributed within the lungs but would tend to aggre-
gate on discrete small areas of the bronchi, which would thus be subjected to a high radia-
tion dose, with the result that in the long run lung cancers might be produced in some
people." Id. at 1558. The British report recommended that "the aim should always be to
keep the level of exposure as low as possible." Id. at 1602.
32. Several prominent scientists discussed the effects of radiation in 1957 before a spe-
cial subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 1957 Hearings, supra note 30,
at 781-1008. Dr. Edward Lewis of the California Institute of Technology testified that he
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
The state of scientific knowledge concerning the pathological
hazards of radiation exposure was certainly advanced beyond the
point where the government could claim that it had no reason to
know of the dangers involved. There was an even greater realiza-
tion by the scientific community of the genetic hazards involved in
radiation exposure. The causal link between ionizing radiation and
gene mutations was well documented in the medical literature. 3
doubted that a threshold dose of radiation existed. Id. at 958-61. Dr. Lewis concluded his
testimony before the special subcommittee stating- "I would like to point out one thing
more and that is that if we assume this straight line, this linearity as it is called, this ab-
sence of threshold, all these things being essentially the same thing, then we come up with
these figures which I am afraid can be twisted to alarm the public unduly. I do think that
the danger comes in legislating a dose that is said to be permissible for the public .... It
would be better to state to the public that there is a distinct possibility that the so-called
permissible dose will hurt a definite number of people. The number damaged will be rela-
tively small we think for small doses, such as from fallout which is what we are talking
about. But the percentage or the number who are expected to be damaged should be stated,
instead of implying that there is no danger from fallout or that the permissible dose will
cause no damage." Id. at 1007-08.
Dr. Shields Warren, former director of the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine,
testified that he believed that there was a threshold dose for induction of leukemia, but did
not say what that dose was, and regarded the absence of a threshold as a possibility. Id. at
1006. In contrast to Dr. Warren's testimony, the statement presented to the AEC's Advisory
Committee for Biology and Medicine by Dr. Curt Stern, a member of that committee, on
October 10, 1953 concluded: "The personal future of exposed individuals even under per-
missible exposure rates, must be considered as probably slightly less favorable than that of
unexposed individuals. This applies to such diseases as leukemia." Minutes of Fortieth
Meeting of AEC Advisory Comm. for Biology and Medicine app. A (Oct. 10, 1953).
Dr. Hardin Jones of the University of California agreed with Dr. Lewis that the induc-
tion of leukemia by radiation was proportional to the dose. 1957 Hearings, supra note 29, at
1002. Dr. Ernest Pollard of Yale University also endorsed the proportionality concept, id. at
996, stating: "I think the linear line is rational. I would like to see policy momentarily at
least based on it. If later on it seems there is a threshold, then we are not too badly off. But
if there is not a threshold, and we bet there is one, we are in trouble." Id. at 1004. In
addition, Dr. Pollard stressed the scientific community's limited knowledge of cellular
processes and warned about the possibility of long-delayed effects from radiation. Id. at 998.
33. A 1927 article revealed that x-rays can cause gene mutations in drosophila flies.
Muller, Artificial Transmutation of the Gene, 66 ScIENcE 84 (1927). The article stated that
it seemed "likely on general considerations" that "the effect is common to most organisms."
Id. at 87. An article in 1948 discussed x-ray induced gene mutation in drosophila flies, stat-
ing that "one may assume that there exists no tolerance dose below which mutations are not
induced." Spencer & Stern, Experiments to Test the Validity of the Linear R-Dose/Muta-
tion Frequency Relation in Drosophila at Low Dosage, 33 GENETcs 43, 64 (1948). Another
article dealing with the same subject appeared in 1949 in Science, and after reviewing all
the relevant experiments concluded: "There is no threshold below which radiation fails to
induce mutations." Uphoff & Stern, The Genetic Effects of Low Intensity Irradiation, 109
SCIENCE 609, 610 (1949). A statement presented to the AEC's Advisory Committee for Biol-
ogy and Medicine recognized that radiation could cause genetic mutations in humans. See
Minutes of Fortieth Meeting of the AEC Advisory Comm. for Biology and Medicine, at app.
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Reports by the National Academy of Sciences3 4 and the British
Medical Research Council 5 also documented the genetic hazards
A (Oct. 10, 1953).
34. The 1956 National Academy of Sciences Report stated that radiation causes muta-
tions and that "practically all radiation-induced mutations which have effects large enough
to be detected are harmful." 1957 Hearings, supra note 30, at 1838. The report explained:
"A small but not negligible part of this harm would appear in the first generation of the
offspring of the person who received the radiation. Most of the harm, however, would re-
main unnoticed, for a shorter or longer time, in the genetic constitution of the successive
generations of offspring. But the harm would persist, and some of it would be expressed in
each generation. On the average, a detrimental mutation, no matter how small its harmful
effect, will in the long run tip the scales against some descendant who carries this mutation,
causing his premature death or his failure to produce the normal number of offspring." Id.
The report left no doubt about the absence of a threshold dose for the induction of
genetic mutations when it stated that "[a]ny radiation dose, however small, can induce some
mutations. There is no minimum amount of radiation dose, that is, which must be exceeded
before any harmful mutations occur." Id. The report also stated: "Additional radiation
(that is, radiation over and above the irreducible minimum due to natural causes) produces
additional mutations (over and above the spontaneous mutations). The probable number of
additional induced mutations occurring in an individual over a period of time is by and
large proportional to the total dose of extra radiation received, over that period, by the
reproductive organs where the germ cells are formed and stored. To the best of our present
knowledge, if we increase the radiation by X%, the gene mutations caused by radiation will
also be increased by X%." Id. at 1839. The report further stated: "It has sometimes been
thought that there may be a rate (say, so much per week) at which a person can receive
radiation with reasonable safety as regards certain types of direct damage to his own person.
But the concept of a safe rate of radiation simply does not make sense if one is concerned
with genetic damage to future generations. What counts, from the point of view of genetic
damage, is not the rate; it is the total accumulated dose to the reproductive cells of the
individual from the beginning of his life up to the time the child is conceived." Id. (empha-
sis in original).
According to the report, "any additional radiation is genetically undesirable." Id. at
1845 (emphasis in original). The report cautioned: "If certain figures (such as 10 roentgens)
occur in a recommendation, it should most emphatically not be assumed that any exposure
less than that figure is, so to speak, 'all right': nor should it be for a moment assumed that
disaster will suddenly descend if one of these figures is exceeded. In any case in which a
figure is stated, it is with the idea: stay just as far under this as you can; do not consider
that this is an amount of radiation which is genetically harmless, for there is no such figure
other than zero." Id. A 1957 statement from the Genetics Society of Japan is in accord with
the National Academy of Sciences Report. See id. at 1945.
The report recommended that "proper safeguards always be taken to minimize the ra-
diation dose to the reproductive cells," and that "every effort be made to assign to tasks
involving higher radiation exposures individuals who, for age or other reasons, are unlikely
thereafter to have additional offspring." Id. at 1846.
35. The 1956 report by the Medical Research Council noted that there was little direct
information about the genetic effects of ionizing radiations on humans and that most of the
information obtained has come from experiments on other organisms. 1957 Hearings, supra
note 30, at 1568. However, the report noted: "Since the genetic mechanism in man is the
same as that in other animal and plant species, and since the animals and plants that have
been studied all show the same type of genetic response to ionizing radiations, it would be




Conclusions drawn from experimental data, along with theo-
retical assumptions based upon knowledge of radiation physics and
the biological processes of the human body, helped to shape the
state of scientific knowledge about the health effects of radiation in
decades past.36 The selected publications illustrate that the state
of scientific knowledge at the time of the atomic testing did not
reflect a belief in the "safety" of any level of radiation. Rather, the
state of knowledge is best described as one of conscious ignorance
as to the potential effect of radiation exposure on humans, if not
an actual belief in the hazards involved.
The government nonetheless placed thousands of individuals
in a situation that it knew could be hazardous. Such knowledge
included an awareness of two factors: the probability of harm and
the magnitude of the potential harm. The probability of harm at
the anticipated dose levels was the more uncertain factor of the
two, but knowledge of this uncertainty should have dictated cau-
tion. Because knowledge concerning the magnitude of the potential
harm was well established, the government knew that if it underes-
timated the probability of harm, then the harm that did occur po-
tentially could be serious.
Atomic Energy Commission Delegation of Responsibility
and Department of Defense Authorization for Excess
Exposure
The AEC delegated its responsibility for the radiological
safety of the troops to the DOD. Thereafter, the DOD authorized
eral pattern." Id.
The report stated that there "is no known threshold for the induction of gene muta-
tions by radiation." Id. at 1569. Furthermore, "in contrast to most other types of biological
response to radiation, damage to the genetic material cannot be repaired and the effect from
repeated exposures is cumulative." Id. at 1570. The report also noted that genetic effects are
greater when the exposed individuals are in their reproductive years. Id.
36. The preceding discussion of scientific literature is not intended to be exhaustive.
For a more extensive bibliography entitled "Radiation Effects on Blood and Blood-Forming
Tissues of Man-1900-March 1956," see 1957 Hearings, supra note 30, at 1893-1921. See
also Atomic Energy and the Law: A Bibliography, 12 VAND. L. REv. 229-70 (1958).
37. The authority of the AEC to "conduct experiments and do research and develop-
ment work in the military application of atomic energy" can be found in the Act of Aug. 1,
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 6, 60 Stat. 755. The AEC was abolished by the Act of Oct. 11,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, tit. I, § 104(a), 88 Stat. 1233, and its functions and personnel were
transferred to the Energy Research and Development Administration. See 42 U.S.C. § 5814
(1976). For an excellent discussion of the AEC's responsibility to protect the public's health
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levels of radiation exposure in excess of the levels recommended by
the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine.38 The details of this
delegation and authorization are best presented by a chronological
examination of various documents, including recently declassified
intragovernmental correspondence, along with notes and tran-
scripts of AEC meetings.3 9 While the military placed greater em-
and safety, see Comment, Nuclear Accidents: Judicial Review of the NRC's Duty to Issue
a Health Warning, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 360-74 (1980).
38. See Washington Post, June 20, 1979, at A5, col. 1; id., May 1, 1979, at A3, col. 1;
id., Apr. 25, 1979, at Al, col. 5.
39. A few months after the AEC had approved the military's request for troop partici-
pation at the November, 1951, nuclear tests, but before those tests had commenced, the
Director of the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine, in a memorandum to the AEC
official who would have overall responsibility in conducting the tests, authorized a maximum
permissible exposure of 3.9r of gamma radiation per 13 week period for each individual
soldier. Memorandum from Dr. Shields Warren to Carroll Tyler (Oct. 11, 1951). After noting
that the AEC's test director could authorize deliberate overexposures, the medical director
stated that "this Division does not look lightly upon radiation excesses." Id. Any authoriza-
tion for an exposure level beyond the 3.9r limit was to be documented fully setting forth the
need for overexposure, the other alternatives available, the number of people to be overex-
posed, the level of such exposure, and the recent exposure of the individuals involved along
with the plans for enabling those individuals to "pay off" their overexposure. Id. The AEC's
medical director wanted a copy of all such documentation. Id. The memorandum empha-
sized that the 3.9r level would not be raised, and although "[m]ilitary personnel cannot be
prevented from making their own decisions ... insofar as they act as an integral part of
this test organization they are requested to fulfill the above requirements for documenta-
tion on overexposure." Id. The memorandum also contained this advice: "[C]ompliance
with the permissible limit should become the mark of distinction in the exercise of ingenu-
ity, rather than a concession to be avoided upon pretext. Indoctrination of this attitude
early in this series may save us much trouble, and possibly radiation injuries, in the several
series to come." Id.
For the November, 1951 tests, the AEC required a distance of seven miles between the
troops and ground zero at blast time. Troop maneuvers after the blast were done in single
file columns behind AEC radiation monitoring personnel. See note 38 supra. The military
expressed dissatisfaction with these AEC restrictions. In a letter from the Armed Forces
Special Weapons Project's Deputy Chief, to the Director of the AEC's Division of Military
Application, it was requested that the troops be allowed to observe a detonation from "a
safe but tactically sound distance." Letter from Brigadier General A.R. Luedecke, USAF, to
Director, AEC Division of Military Application (Mar. 7, 1952). The letter noted that the
1951 maneuvers, "though of definite value as an initial indoctrination vehicle, had some
unfavorable psychological effects" because of the "tactically unrealistic distance of seven
miles to which all participating troops were required to withdraw for the detonation." Id.
Requesting that the seven mile limit be reduced to 7,000 yards (3.9 miles), the letter con-
cluded that the "exercise recommended for indoctrination with the atomic weapon has been
devised to preclude casualties in any contingency. The Military Services are prepared and
desire to accept full responsibility for the safety of all participating troop units and troop
observers." Id.
Aware of the military's dissatisfaction with the AEC imposed restrictions, the AEC's
medical director sent a memorandum to the AEC's Division of Military Application stating:
"The Division of Biology and Medicine recognizes that it is not its function to set standards
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phasis upon the training value of the maneuvers than did the AEC,
for the military nor to impede the operations of the Department of Defense. However, the
test and the Continental Proving Ground are the responsibility of the Commission both in
fact and in the public mind.
"The Division of Biology and Medicine recommends against permitting troops to be
closer to ground zero than the seven miles used in the Desert Rock [1951] operation for the
following reasons: 1. The Continental Proving Ground is of great value to the program of
the Atomic Energy Commission and has been accepted by the public as safe. 2. Accidents
occurring at the time and place of an atomic explosion are magnified by the press out of all
proportion to their importance, and any injury or death during the operation might well
have serious adverse effects. 3. The explosion is experimental in type and its yield cannot be
predicted with accuracy.
"While there is very little likelihood that the fallout of fission products would be a
hazard under the operating circumstances of the tests, there is uncertainty of the factors
controlling blast effects. Also, although the record of the Air Force in the accuracy of the
drops has been outstandingly good, precision of the detonation point cannot be guaranteed."
Memorandum from Dr. Shields Warren to Brigadier General K.E. Fields, Director, AEC
Division of Military Applications (Mar. 25, 1952).
A few days later, the AEC considered the military's requests. A report dated March 31,
1952, by the AEC's Division of Military Application was reviewed by the AEC. The Teport
noted the military's desire to "prove that U.S. troops in combat could survive a detonation
of this kind at this distance in field fortifications and emerge immediately thereafter in
condition to exploit the enemy's resultant confusion. Their ability to exploit this post-shot
confusion, however, is an inverse function of their proximity to ground zero." Report by
AEC Director of Military Application, Troop Participation in Operation Tumbler-Snapper
2-3 (Mar. 31, 1952). According to the report, the Marines stated that they would not partici-
pate if the seven mile limitation remained in effect. Id. at 3. In assessing the possible
hazards of moving the troops to 7,000 yards from ground zero, the danger of radiation expo-
sure was considered to be minor. Id. There was greater concern for the possibility of eye
damage "resulting from possible careless exposure on the part of individual soldiers." Id. at
4. The report noted the objection of the Division of Biology and Medicine, but recom-
mended that the AEC approve the military's request. Id. at 5.
On April 1, 1952, the AEC approved the recommendations of its Division of Military
Application and allowed the seven mile limit for troop participation to be reduced to 7,000
yards. See Notes of AEC Meeting No. 677 (Apr. 1, 1952). The official notes of that meeting
do not reveal any critical analysis of the military's plan with regard to the hazards of radia-
tion that were then known. Although a staff member of the Division of Biology stated that
the troops should be in no danger, provided all safety instructions were followed, one of the
Commissioners "emphasized the necessity for pointing out to the military that the distance
they proposed to station troops from the point of detonation was less than the distance
permitted by AEC safety standards." Id. According to the notes, the point was made that
the Commission "is not in any way lowering its safety standards for civilians, and uncertain-
ties and accompanying danger always exist in a nuclear detonation." Id. The Commission
then discussed "the necessity for realistic training by the military in all fields, often accom-
panied by serious injuries, and that such training was also necessary in the field of atomic
weapons." Id.
The day following that meeting, a letter from the Chairman of the AEC to the Chief of
the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project advised the military of the AEC's action regard-
ing troop participation: "We realize the value and urgency of obtaining quantitative infor-
mation on close tactical support of troops as well as the value of psychological indoctrina-
tion. If officials of the Department of Defense, after review of the hazards involved, still feel
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the AEC, primarily its medical division, tended to be more con-
that a military requirement justifies the maneuver, the Commission would enter no objec-
tion to stationing troops at not less than 7,000 yards from ground zero, provided that the
Exercise Director [the military commander] prepares a safety plan to minimize risk of in-
jury which is acceptable to the Test Manager [the ABC official in charge]. The responsibility
for troop compliance with this safety plan rests, of course, with the Exercise Director ...
In connection with radiological monitoring of this advance, it is assumed that monitoring
teams will be provided from the troops and that no requirement whatever will be placed on
the monitoring group of the test organization [AEC], since the latter will be otherwise occu-
pied at shot time." Letter from Gordon Dean to General Herbert B. Loper (Apr. 2, 1952).
In response to this letter, the Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project de-
scribed the military's planned maneuvers to the Director of the AEC's Division of Military
Application: "An army battalion (approximately 1100) will dig in as close to ground zero as
permissible. Following the explosion, the battalion proceeds to and through ground zero to
link up with a company (approximately 200) of airborne troops dropped in the vicinity of
ground zero. All troops then proceed out of the area [and] return to camp. During the ad-
vance to ground zero or on the return to camp, troops will pass displays of exposed equip-
ment .... Light reconnaissance vehicles will pass through ground zero as an advance ele-
ment in the battalion link-up with the airborne company. In the event that an undue delay
occurs between the explosion and the time the battalion is permitted to advance to ground
zero, troops will move by vehicle toward ground zero. This will reduce the time lag in reach-
ing ground zero and will emphasize to participants the high degree of safety in entering the
area of ground zero immediately following an air burst of an atomic bomb .... It is empha-
sized that the Department of the Army desires to inject the maximum possible realism into
the exercise. It is therefore strongly recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission be
urged to approve all of the elements of the above plan that are not incompatible with essen-
tial technical restrictions." Letter from General Herbert B. Loper to Director, AEC Division
of Military Application (Apr. 3, 1952).
The AEC held a meeting the same day the letter informing them of the Army's planned
maneuvers was received. The notes of that meeting state: "The Chairman said that there
appeared to be no reason for the Commission to object to the participation of the paratroop-
ers provided their exercise was so arranged as to avoid interference with test operations."
Notes of AEC Meeting No. 679 (Apr. 3, 1952). After the AEC meeting, the military was
notified of the AEC's approval of the planned maneuvers. In a letter from the Chairman of
the AEC to the Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, the military was re-
minded to keep the individual soldier's radiological exposure for the maneuver to 3r. Letter
from Gordon Dean to General Herbert B. Loper (approximate date, a few days after April 3,
1952). For an unexplained reason, the 3r figure does not coincide with the earlier 3.9r figure.
See Memorandum from Dr. Shields Warren to Carroll Tyler (Oct. 11, 1951). However, a
1951 report on the Nevada "Buster-Jangle" test series of that year states that an "exposure
limit of 3r was agreed on prior to the test .... The Division of Biology and Medicine
agreed to an unpublicized exposure of 3.9r, which was used to give the 3r limit added flex-
ibility where absolutely necessary." Jacobs, Precautions Are Being Taken by Those Who
Know, THE ATLANTIc, Feb., 1971, at 53.
After the 1952 test series, the military was still dissatisfied with AEC restrictions im-
posed upon the location of troops and level of radiation exposure. Part of this dissatisfaction
was a result of lie detector examinations and psychological studies involving the troops. The
research led the military to conclude that the maneuvers were not "realistic" enough. See
Washington Post, Apr. 25, 1979, at Al, col. 5. The psychological studies were conducted for
the military by the Operations Research Office of The Johns Hopkins University. Id. A
letter from the AEC's Weapons Research Branch to the AEC's Division of Biology and
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 32
cerned about troop safety than did the military. The AEC's origi-
Medicine noted that "20R has been allowed crews of sampling aircraft without apparent ill
effect while the limit for ground personnel has been maintained at 3R." Letter from Captain
John T. Hayward, USN, Chief, AEC Weapons Research Branch, to Dr. John C. Bugher,
Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine (Sept. 19, 1952). The Marine Corps sent a
letter to the Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project that stated: "The safety
regulations under which past Desert Rock type exercises have been conducted have limited
the training value of these exercises .... In view of the fact that the permissible radiation
dosage limits for Atomic Energy Commission and Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
personnel is established on a continuing exposure basis, it is believed that this permissible
dose could be raised for military personnel participating on a one-shot basis. It is therefore
recommended that the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project request Atomic En-
ergy Commission concurrence of a permissible dosage limit of six (6) roentgens for military
personnel participating in Exercise Desert Rock V [the 1953 test exercises]. It should be
noted that it will continue to be the policy of the Marine Corps to expose personnel to the
minimum radiation dosages necessary to accomplish the desired training objectives ....
Furthermore, it is believed that trained, disciplined troops and troop observers can be sta-
tioned at more realistic distances from ground zero and still be within reasonable safety
requirements for peace-time training." Letter from Commandant of the Marine Corps to
Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (Oct. 1, 1952). A letter dated two weeks later
from the Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to the Director of the AEC's
Division of Military Application stated that the DOD wished to "assume full responsibility
for the physical and radiological safety of troops and troop observers while in the Nevada
Proving Grounds." Letter from Major General Herbert B. Loper to Brigadier General K.E.
Fields (Oct. 15, 1952). Furthermore, the letter noted that, if "the safety standards of the
DOD are less conservative than those established by the AEC, and if accident or criticism
result, the DOD will be prepared to make a public announcement of those facts." Id.
Responding to the military's request for relaxation of the radiation exposure limits, a
letter from the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine to the AEC's Weapons Research
Branch stated "the Division of Biology and Medicine recommends that there should be no
change from the established AEC policy for test operations of a total exposure of not over
3.9r of gamma radiation per 13 weeks." Letter from Dr. John C. Bugher to Captain John T.
Hayward (Oct. 20, 1952).
Before formal consideration of the military's requests by the AEC, a report by the
AEC's Division of Military Application was considered. The report noted that the military
was requesting a total radiation exposure level of 6r while the AEC limit was 3.9r. In dis-
cussing the military's request to assume full responsibility for physical and radiological
safety of the troops, the report stated: "If the AEC should concur as requested, it would
obviously be possible that the DOD might set less conservative limits for exposure than the
AEC, that military personnel might be injured, and that the fault might be attributed to the
AEC's 'failure to control the maneuver."' Report by AEC Director of Military Applications,
Troop Participation in Continental Tests 2-4 (Dec. 22, 1952). This concern about which
agency, the AEC or the DOD, would receive the blame for any injury dominated the rest of
the report. A concern for troop safety is not evident. Also mentioned was "the DOD need to
develop its own criteria and doctrine for the use of atomic weapons in the same way as for
any other weapons." Id. at 5. The report suggested the DOD's needs be respected by "al-
lowing the DOD maximum freedom of action in these maneuvers short of unacceptable in-
terference with AEC experiments or of jeopardizing, through unwarranted criticism, the
AEC's ability to perform its own mission." Id. The report concluded with a recommendation
that responsibility for troop safety be delegated to the DOD, but that the military's Exercise
Director should be required to submit a safety plan to the AEC's Test Manager for informa-
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nal restrictions on radiation exposure levels and troop distance
from ground zero met with dissatisfaction from the military. Con-
sequently, the original restrictions were eroded in order that the
permissible levels of radiation exposure could be increased, and the
troops were moved closer to ground zero.
tion only. -According to the report, "[s]hould a truly dangerous situation be apparent, the
DOD should so be advised by letter from the Commission." Id. at 7. Such "advice" to the
DOD would be necessary, the report stated, because the AEC "might still be subject to
criticism in case of injury unless it had taken separate and additional exception to the DOD
plan when received." Id. at 5. It was noted that the Division of Biology and Medicine con-
curred in the conclusions of the report. Id. at 8. At this time the Director of the AEC's
Division of Biology and Medicine was no longer Dr. Shields Warren, but was Dr. John C.
Bugher. Apparently, Dr. Bugher changed his position subsequent to October 20, 1952. See
Letter from Dr. John C. Bugher to Captain John T. Hayward (Oct. 20, 1952).
On December 23, 1952, the AEC adopted the recommendations of the Division of Mili-
tary Application. Notes of that meeting state: "General Fields [Director, AEC Division of
Military Application] outlined the present plans of the DOD for extensive troop participa-
tion in the UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE [1953] series. He pointed out that the most significant
point of difference between the present proposal and the previous troop participation exer-
cise was that in the forthcoming tests the usual limits of physical exposure to weapons ef-
fects would probably be exceeded. It was therefore proposed that responsibility for the
physical safety of the troops participating in the exercise be delegated to the DOD and that
the DOD be informed of the possibility that exceeding the normal limits of exposure to
radiation or pressure might endanger the participating personneL Dr. Bugher briefly dis-
cussed the possible effects of exceeding the normal radiation and pressure limits to the ex-
tent proposed by the DOD. "Mr. Dean [Chairman of the AEC] observed that since the DOD
had apparently considered it necessary to conduct the exercises in this manner, the AEC
was not in a position to recommend that the normal limits be observed." Notes of AEC
Meeting No. 794 (Dec. 23, 1952).
As late as 1957 there was still dissatisfaction within the military concerning restrictions
on troop participation at nuclear tests. The final report of operations for the troop exercises
at the 1957 test series expressed displeasure with the status quo that entailed the military
having to work around the AEC's tests. See Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII, Final Re-
port of Operations 71 (Nov. 25, 1957). The report stated a desire that the military conduct
its own detonations, so as to be free of any AEC control, suggesting that "[a]s a long range
objective, the feasibility of conducting such training on a military reservation should be
explored. The objective should be the integration of atomic training into annual training
programs on a regularly scheduled basis at an atomic training center." Id.
The military's continuing desire for "realism" in its atomic maneuvers may have af-
fected the way the two related issues of offsite fallout and underground testing were han-
dled by the AEC. The notes of an AEC meeting held on November 14, 1958, state: "Mr.
McCone [AEC Commissioner] recommended and the Commissioners agreed that if weapons
tests are to be resumed by the United States, a strict limitation on off-site fallout should not
be announced at this time. Mr. Libby [AEC Commissioner] added that AEC's ability to
develop specific instruments with clean devices was evident; however, he understood there
was a desire by the military for some degree of off-site radiation for troop training purposes.
In commenting on Mr. McCone's question regarding the limitation of future testing only to
undergroufid shots, Mr. Libby said the AEC could accept this position but he felt it would
impair the DOD training program and DOD weapons development." Notes of AEC Meeting
No. 1427 (Nov. 14, 1958).
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The documents in this chronological history are much more
significant when viewed as a coherent whole. A process is revealed
in which the AEC's vision of public relations and undue deference
to the military combined with the military's disregard of known
hazards and a zeal for "realism" to produce a reordering of priori-
ties that left little concern for individual safety.
The degree to which society can further its own interests by
properly invading the interests of the individual is a serious issue.
In this situation, the process became infected to such an extent
that the interests of the individual were not adequately con-
fronted. The government did not completely ignore the issue of
troop safety; ultimately, however, it allowed the crucial determina-
tions to be made by those who had demonstrated the least interest
in such safety.
The Inadequacy of DOD Dosimetry
Many of the soldiers who participated in the nuclear tests did
not wear film badges to record their exposure to individual doses of
radiation. 0 In 1951, when the AEC controlled radiation safety,
each soldier wore a badge. During the 1952, 1953, and 1955 test
series, however, only one badge was issued per platoon (about 35
soldiers). During this period, the Army Surgeon General's policy
was that one-time exposures need not be reported. Dr. Shields
Warren, the director of the AEC's Division of Biology and
Medicine from 1947 to 1952, states that he was unaware of such a
practice and that it "is contrary to all radiation protection stan-
dards I'm aware of.' 1
The use of film badges alone, however, did not measure all
forms of ionizing radiation that were hazardous. Although radia-
tion from neutrons, alpha rays, and beta rays were produced with
each blast, the military's film badge only recorded gamma rays. Ac-
cordingly, an Army report from 1957 describing radiation exposure
limits stated that its discussion was limited to gamma radiation
only: "As long as a limit of 5 roentgens gamma is observed, alpha,
40. See DOD REPLIES To QUESTIONS, supra note 7, at B-5(c); 1978 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 279-82 (1970 AEC study); id. at 251 (statement of Major Alan Skerker, Depart-
ment of the Army); Washington Post, May 1, 1979, at A3, col. 1.
41. Washington Post, May 1, 1979, at A3, col. 1. Dr. Warren also stated that "[i]t was
rather characteristic of the Army to downgrade the importance of radiation." Id. The mili-
tary's failure to badge each individual was also based on a lack of enough trained personnel
who could process the badges. Id.
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beta, and neutron radiation will not be included until such time as
AEC may prescribe safety criteria for one or more of these last
three. '42 In addition, there was no monitoring of radiation that was
ingested or inhaled.43
In 1978, a Department of the Army spokesman read from 1955
Army project reports about the dosimetry procedure in use to a
congressional subcommittee. The testimony revealed that the
Army was aware of the limitations and the significance of those
limitations in its dosimetry program."
42. Exercise Desert Rock VII & VIII, Final Report of Operations 97 (Nov. 25, 1957).
43. See DOD REPLIES TO QUESTIONS, supra note 7, at B-7; id. at A-2 (executive sum-
mary of Ad hoc Committee formed by Army Surgeon General to review troop participation
in nuclear tests concludes that radiation safety procedures did not account for hazard of
internal emitters; magnitude and significance of internal exposure cannot be determined at
this time (1977-78)); 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 52 (statement of Martin Sperling of
Science Applications, Inc., estimates that a particular soldier at one test could have inhaled
as much as 100r); id. at 1121 (DOD replies to questions from subcommittee). A radionuclide
emitting alpha particles can be inhaled or ingested, thus irradiating internal tissues. See J.
GOFMAN & A. TAMPLIN, PoIsoNED PownR 42 (1979). Troops also received unmonitored expo-
sure while rehearsing maneuvers in previously contaminated areas. See Washington Post,
Feb. 1, 1979, at A4, col 1.
44. "Major Skerker... Satisfactory tactical dosimeters and rate meters are now
available for measuring gamma radiation .... However, beta and neutron radiations can
also have important biological effects. The importance of these effects from nuclear detona-
tions is becoming more and more recognized .... No available rate meter meets military
specifications and measures beta radiation satisfactorily. Casualties could easily result from
beta burns received in a contaminated area indicated safe by gamma instruments....
"Mr. Rogers. And is not the fallout heavy in beta?
"Major Skerker. Yes." 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 317-18 (testimony of Major Alan
Skerker, Department of the Army).
Additional testimony of Major Skerker established that alpha radiation was not mea-
sured at the tests:
"Mr. Carter. What about alpha rays, how are they recorded?
"Major Skerker. No way of determine [sic] that, sir.
"Mr. Rogers. No way of determining those.
"Major Skerker. No, sir.
"Mr. Carter. And they were the ones that were in the dust, supposedly, nearest to the site,
nearest to ground zero?
"Major Skerker. Well, you had a mixture of alpha, beta, and gamma.
"Mr. Carter. All of them.
"Major Skerker. The proposition is basically that if you go into a mixed radiation field from
a fission device, that the predominant radiation is gamma. You can measure that, and if you
can stay within what you believe to be reasonable amount-
"Mr. Carter. But you really do not know.
"Major Skerker. You really do not know; that is correct.
"Mr. Carter. You do not know if alpha was more or less because there was no way of mea-
suring it, was there?
"Major Skerker. No way of measuring it ..
Id. at 238-39. See generally Radiation Protection: Hearings before the Subcomm. on En-
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A proper concern for troop safety would not have allowed ex-
posure to unmonitored radiation that was known to have adverse
biological effects. Moreover, the absence of this dosage information
increases the uncertainty regarding a causal link between exposure
and injury.
Inadequate Protection
During the military maneuvers on the atomic desert, there was
no special protective clothing worn by the troops. Dust from the
desert floor, kicked up by the advance of scores of foot soldiers,
helicoptors, and other military vehicles, contained radioactivity
that was easily inhaled and ingested by the troops.45 In addition,
an Army report on the 1957 maneuvers states that "[tihe primary
means of decontamination employed was the sweeping of person-
nel and vehicles with brooms to remove contaminated dust." 6 De-
ergy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 561-92 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Radiation Protection
Hearings].
45. See DOD RaPLms To QUESIONS, supra note 7, at B-4(c), B-13(c)(1)-(4), d(1), (4):
"Q. Any protective clothing issued to troops? Any gas masks or respirators? A. The normal
fatigue uniform was worn by all participants. Gas masks were worn on occasion, but this was
not the general rule. No other protective clothing for participating troops is reported. Re-
search is still ongoing. Q. Can you describe dust conditions at Smoky and other blasts after
detonation and during post-blast maneuvers? A. The length of time the dust conditions
remained after a blast varies as a function of the yield, height of burst, wind conditions and
soil type. Q. Did helicopters moving assault troops toward ground zero stir up considerable
dust? A. Yes, when landing or taking off. Q. Is it possible that such dust would contain
radioactive materials? A. Dust stirred up by helicopters during landing or take off may have
contained radioactive particulate either if the area had been subject to fallout or if the area
was sufficiently close to ground zero that substantial neutron activation of the soil had taken
place. Neutron activation of the soil is generally limited to a fairly short range, such as 1,000
years [sic] from ground zero for shot Smoky. Q. Were there any safeguards to reduce troop
exposures to radioactive dust? A. In the early Desert Rock series, and on Desert Rock V
[1953], it appears that gas masks and other protective gear wear [sic] used. While gas masks
were often carried in other series, there is little indication they were used. Further research
will seek more precise information on this matter. Q. What additional fallout material would
exist in the area of a device which was detonated from a tower rather than balloon- or air-
detonated? A. In a shot from a balloon-suspended device, the only radioactive debris comes
from the fission products of the detonated device and from soil particulate which has been
drawn up into the hot fireball and has had fission products attached to it. In a tower shot,
much-if not all-of the iron in the tower is vaporized and made radioactive in the same
process. Thus, the fallout is therefore greater than from a balloon-suspended shot of the
same yield and altitude. Q. Would troops entering the area of ground zero after such a blast
risk exposure to inhalation or ingestion of tower particles or vapors? A. Yes." See also 1978
Hearings, supra note 1, at 157-58 (no gas masks or other special clothing required).
46. Exercise Desert Rock VII & VIII, Final Report of Operations 6 (Nov. 25, 1957).
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partment of Defense testimony in 1978 pointed out that the danger
of such a procedure included inhalation of radioactive material.
Nonetheless, not only did the government fail to provide adequate
protection, but the soldiers themselves were not in a position to do
any better, because most were nonvolunteers s and uninformed
about the hazards.
Soldiers Not Informed of Hazards
Information regarding the true hazards of radiation exposure
never reached the troops. The military was more concerned with
the elimination of fear that might be associated with the bomb and
convincing the soldiers that they were not "obsolete."
A military publication in 1952 told the soldiers that a nuclear
air burst would not "make anything in the area dangerously radio-
47. "Mr. Rogers. And what was the decontamination procedure? One of them said
they told him to flip his jacket to get the dust off of it, and he brushed his boots with a
whisk broom. Is that the procedure?
"Major Skerker. The initial types of decontamination procedures would in fact be to dis-
lodge the loose material from the clothing or vehicles; that would mean brooming down,
hosing down, things like that. Silly as it may sound, that is a factor.
"Mr. Carter. What about that material he had inhaled in his lungs?
"Major Skerker. What we are suggesting there, everything he shook off, he breathes in. You
are right, sir, I mean, some amount of that, that you would shake off from your body would
be resuspended and inhaled." 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 326 (testimony of Major Alan
Skerker, Department of the Army).
48. According to the DOD, "[w]ith few exceptions, the participants and observers were
not volunteers." DOD REPLIES TO QUESTIONS, supra note 7, at B-3. The DOD had revealed
that about 43 volunteers participated in nuclear blast exercises at a closer range than other
troops. At some shots they were only 2,000 yards (1 miles) from ground zero, and at one
aerial detonation, volunteers stood at ground zero, 18,000 feet under the explosion. See 1978
Hearings, supra note 1, at 266 (statement of Major Alan Skerker, Department of the Army).
Whether these 43 volunteers were informed adequately of the hazards involved is not clear.
A quotation from a post-shot report by one of the volunteers does not indicate a satisfactory
appreciation of the risks: "The dust was sufficient to make the visibility very poor beyond a
hundred yards or so in any direction, but was not heavy enough to be suffocating. I did not
feel the need of putting on my gas mask, and did not use it." Report of Participation in
Selected Volunteer Programs of Desert Rock V-7 (Apr. 25, 1953) (report of Captain Robert
A. Hinners, USN, at 9). The volunteers stationed 18,000 feet below a nuclear explosion at
ground zero were there to prove that an atomic air-to-air rocket was "safe to use defensively
over cities." NEWSWEEK, July 29, 1957, at 21. A questionnaire given to some of the 43 volun-
teers after the shot included such questions as: "Did you at all times feel that you were in
complete control of all your facilities?"; and "Do you believe that you could have emerged
from the trench immediately after the blast and have efficiently engaged in close combat?"
Report of Participation in Selected Volunteer Programs of Desert Rock V-7 (Apr. 25, 1953).
See also AToIc SOLDIERS, supra note 3, at 60-61, 88-90.
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active," and that "the question of nuclear radiation is not of di-
rect concern to troops who will enter the area of a bomb air burst
soon afterwards, because there is no significant radioactivity pre-
sent after the first 90 seconds." 50 "In fact," the article continued,
"a new mission for airborne assault forces might well develop: to
mop up the remainder of a huge reserve concentration after it had
been A-bombed! '51
Another military publication told the soldiers that a position
several miles from ground zero is "a safe distance" 2 and that the
permissible dosage of radiation, "as far as we know, does no harm
at all."' s According to the publication, particles of fallout after an
air burst "definitely do not present any hazard to personnel. ' ' 4
The possibility of health effects appearing many years after expo-
sure was not mentioned. Rather, the publication stated that the
"length of time before damage appears may vary from a few hours
to several days. ' 55 The publication concluded with this advice:
"Learn to respect, but not to be blindly fearful of A-weapons."56
Military publications continued to make similar statements
throughout the decade of the 1950's. Soldiers were told that the
most difficult problem with nuclear weapons is not handling them,
but devising the appropriate tactics and logistics for their use.5 7
The atomic fighting force was envisioned as "commanded by young
officers possessed of the fortitude necessary to withstand the shock
of the opening phases of atomic warfare."58 According to one publi-
cation, "[r]adiation presented no problem" 59 at a test involving ar-
mored tank maneuvers, despite the fact that recently declassified
army documents report radiation levels of up to 12r inside the
49. Infantry School Quarterly, Oct., 1952, at 29.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 31.
52. Armed Forces Talk, Sept. 19, 1952, at 3.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 15. Also included at the end of this publication was the following- "A. (If
anyone in your discussion group has seen an atomic bomb burst, ask him to describe it.)
"B. Many of the men interviewed after one atomic burst at Desert Rock said they would pay
anywhere from $25 to $500 to see 'the show' again. Most of those interviewed said that they
would pay between $25 and $50. How much would you be willing to pay to see an A-bomb
burst at Desert Rock?" Id.
57. See Infantry School Quarterly, Apr., 1957, at 6; id., Apr., 1955, at 14.
58. Id., Apr., 1955, at 14. No mention is made of genetic hazards in this article.
59. Armor, May-June, 1955, at 13.
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tanks.60 One article stated that "[t]he deadliest killer in a thermo-
nuclear war may not be heat or blast or radiation. It may be
panic."61 It continued:
How many times have you heard remarks like these?
"Once you are exposed to radiation, your number is up."
"The greatest threat produced by a nuclear explosion is from
radiation."
"Radioactivity causes sterility."
None of these statements happens to be true. They are exag-
gerations-rumors-the seeds of panic-and they can do incalcu-
lable harm.
The facts are these:
Your troops can move into or leave an exposed area a few
minutes after an air burst. Surface and sub-surface bursts will re-
quire more caution.
A moderate dose of gamma radiation is rarely fatal, and even
casualties with severe doses can usually be helped by medical
treatment .... A soldier is not a casualty until he requires treat-
ment. Even though he has been exposed to a lethal dose of radia-
tion, he can perform his combat mission until symptoms appear.
Radioactivity does not permanently affect sexual potency.
Men exposed to radiation can have normal, healthy children. Ra-
diation sufficient to produce permanent sterility or impotency
would also be lethal.6 2
In 1957, troops were told that if they move quickly through a con-
taminated area they "will not suffer casualties." 63 In the case of
smaller atomic weapons, the fallout hazard "can be disregarded.""
Many of the same themes also were presented in military
training films from the 1950's.5 The troops were told that the
atomic age would not render them obsolete. The blast and heat
effects of nuclear weapons were stressed while radiation dangers
60. See Army Summary of Test Shot Reports, Working Copy, reprinted in Cranston
Hearings, supra note 4, at 52.
61. Infantry School Quarterly, Oct., 1955, at 11.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Infantry School Quarterly, Jan., 1957, at 43.
64. Id. at 45.
65. See The Armor Soldier on the Nuclear Battlefield, TF 17-2826 (1959); Individual
Protection Against Atomic Attack, TF 20-2531 (1957); Troop Indoctrination for an Atomic
Exercise, TF 21-1921 (1954); Radioactive Contamination, MF 39-8148 (1952); The Medical
Aspects of Nuclear Radiation, MF 8-7897 (1950); Effects of Atomic Weapons on Troops in
the Field, MY 20-8598 (date unavailable). These films are available from the Department of
the Army, Defense Audiovisual Agency, Distribution and Depository Activity, Tobyhanna,
Pennsylvania, 18466.
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were deemphasized. The word "safe" was used when discussing ra-
diation exposure. Moreover, these films conveyed a sense of cer-
tainty regarding radiation knowledge that was not present in the
scientific community at that time."6 The training films did not
mention cancer, leukemia, or other latent pathological effects from
radiation exposure.8 7 The films made at the end of the decade
stated the same things as films made at the beginning of the dec-
ade, thus ignoring the increase in scientific knowledge about radia-
tion hazards that occurred during the decade of the 1950's.
Lack of Medical Followup
One would have expected the government to realize that mis-
information would lull many veterans into a false sense of security
regarding their health, and therefore to initiate a process whereby
all of those affected could be given the correct information and
provided with proper medical monitoring. Before 1977, however,
there was no medical monitoring of the troops who were present at
the nuclear blasts.68 The government first became involved in med-
ical monitoring when an exposed soldier who was dying of leuke-
mia in a Salt Lake City, Utah, hospital told his physician in Nov-
ember, 1976, about a nuclear test he witnessed in 1957. This
information reached the United States Public Health Service's
Center for Disease Control, which was interested in conducting
field epidemiological studies of cancer cases. Following inquiries by
the Center, the DOD and other government agencies finally began
to take some action. 9
In 1977, at the request of the Army Surgeon General, an ad
hoc committee was formed within the DOD to review the problem.
The committee's preliminary conclusions stated that "there is no
scientific basis to support a requirement for a general medical fol-
low up of nuclear test participants and no reasonable cause for
66. See notes 28-36 & accompanying text supra.
67. To the military, a harmful dose was one that had immediate debilitating ef-
fects-anything less had no military significance and thus was not mentioned.
68. Nonmilitary government personnel who have had radiation exposure in excess of
government standards at the Nevada Test Site and in the Pacific "have not been told that
their exposures can potentially increase the risk of cancer or other disease." 1978 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 1163 (DOD replies to subcommittee questions).
69. See Cranston Hearings, supra note 4, at 281-90 (statement of Dr. Clark W. Heath,
Jr., M.D., Director, Chronic Disease Division Bureau of Epidemiology, Center for Disease
Control); id. at 17 (testimony of Vice Admiral Robert R. Monroe, Director,- Defense Nuclear
Agency); NEwSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1978, at 57; New York Times, Dec. 25, 1977, at A18, col. 1.
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public apprehension regarding the state of health of those who did
participate. '7 0 This conclusion was reached even though the com-
mittee was aware that initial investigations by the Center for Dis-
ease Control had indicated an abnormally high rate of cancer
among the troops present at a 1957 blast called "Smoky. '71
In 1978, it was revealed that the government had been alerted
to the problem in a more formal manner in 1970. After the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company aired a report about the atomic vet-
erans, Congressman Olin Teague wrote a letter to Secretary of De-
fense Melvin Laird requesting more information and a medical
followup. Nothing of consequence was ever done.72 Since that time,
private legal action has been taken to compel the government to
issue warnings and provide followup medical care for everyone in-
volved, but the government has resisted these efforts.7 3
Currently, the government is sponsoring studies by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and the Center for Disease Control
into the health effects of the atomic tests on some of the veter-
ans.' These studies will take several years to complete, however,
and their primary purpose is to gather scientific data. There is no
government activity attempting to notify every affected veteran. 5
Any medical followup that is implemented will be difficult be-
cause many of the records needed do not exist.78 There was no cen-
tral records depository for troops who participated in atomic ma-
neuvers. 7  Furthermore, in 1973 a fire in a government building
70. Executive Summary of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Military Participation in
Atmospheric Tests, reprinted in Cranston Hearings, supra note 4, at 4.
71. Id. at 3.
72. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 1110 (testimony of Vice Admiral Robert R.
Monroe, Director, Defense Nuclear Agency).
73. See notes 103-06 & accompanying text infra.
74. See Cranston Hearings, supra note 4, at 291 (statement of Semour Jablon, Na-
tional Academy of Sciences). Preliminary studies by the Center for Disease Control indicate
a significantly higher than expected incidence of leukemia among veterans who attended
shot "Smoky" in 1957. See Caldwell, Kelley & Heath, Leukemia Among Participants in
Military Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test: A Preliminary Report, 244 J. Am. MED. A.
1575 (1980).
75. The government is in the process of centralizing and coordinating all of its infor-
mation on the subject, including the identification of affected veterans. A toll free telephone
number has been established (800-336-3068), see New York Times, June 20, 1979, at A24,
col. 6, for veterans to call, but as yet, the government is not initiating contact with every
affected veteran to recommend that medical monitoring be done.
76. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 1104-05.
77. See id. at 272-73, 310-16.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
destroyed millions of military personnel records.78 Thus many vet-
erans are now finding it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
prove that they attended a nuclear blast. Those who can prove
their attendance are finding it equally difficult to prove the dosage
level of radiation to which they were exposed. 9
Having knowingly exposed soldiers to a situation that could
result in adverse consequences many years later, the government
had a duty to compile and safeguard records of that exposure. Fail-
ure to do so is unjustifiable. The consequences of that failure are:
(1) an inability to contact all those who were involved, and (2) the
creation of an evidentiary void that could preclude many veterans
from obtaining relief.
The magnitude of the hazards involved in forced exposure to
radiation, as they were known at the time of the testing, far out-
weighed the military need for maneuvers entailing such exposure.
However, if the military need was imperative, then fully informed
volunteers should have been used. In any case, adequate dosime-
try, protection, recordkeeping, and medical monitoring were abso-
lutely required. Failure of the government to meet even these min-
imum requirements must therefore be considered unreasonable.
Administrative and Legal Impediments to Relief
Approximately eight hundred and thirty claims for compensa-
tion for disorders alleged to have been induced by radiation from
nuclear tests have been denied by the Veterans Administration
(VA).80 This represents a denial rate of about ninety-nine per-
cent." It is the duty of the VA to pay compensation for service
78. See id. at 1098-1100.
79, The DOD's ad hoc committee concluded: "The fact that all participants in the
nuclear weapons program were not issued film badges and the failure to maintain central
control of radiation dosimetry records have resulted in a loss of dosimetry data. Corrobora-
tive information to establish the participation of some individuals will be difficult to obtain,
and it [is] unlikely that [information for] all individuals who participated will ever be ob-
tained." Executive Summary of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Military Participation in
Atmospheric Tests, reprinted in Cranston Hearings, supra note 4, at 2.
80. Internal VA Working Memorandum entitled "Radiation Exposure Claims" (Feb. 2,
1981). A class action suit has been filed against the VA and others by the National Veterans
Law Center in Washington, D.C. Complaint for Plaintiff at 3, Gott v. Cleland, Civ. No. 80-
0906 (D.D.C., fied July, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Complaint]. See note 95 infra. See gen-
erally New York Times, Apr. 11, 1980, at A10, col. 1.
81. Internal VA Working Memorandum entitled "Radiation Exposure Claims" (Feb. 2,
1981). See generally New York Times, Nov. 27, 1979, at A18, col. 1; Washington Post, Nov.
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connected disability or death."2 Accordingly, the VA has promul-
gated regulations relating to the establishment of disorders as be-
ing service connected. These regulations state in part:
Service connection connotes many factors but basically it means
that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular in-
jury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with
service in the Armed Forces, or if preexisting such service, was
aggravated therein. This may be accomplished by affirmatively
showing inception or aggravation during service or through the
application of statutory presumptions .... Determinations as to
service connection will be based on review of the entire evidence
of record, with due consideration to the policy of the Veterans
Administration to administer the law under a broad and liberal
interpretation consistent with the facts in each individual
case....
Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed
after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to
service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service.8s
The VA has been unclear as to what level of proof is required
to show service connection and which party should bear that bur-
den. The VA has stated: "Where the evidence in its entirety cre-
ates a reasonable doubt as distinguished from speculation or re-
mote possibility, such doubt should be resolved in favor of service
connection."84 In addition, a VA official has testified: "We have a
basic doctrine of reasonable doubt . . . in favor of the claimant
which means if you balance the facts 50-50 pro and con, we are
required by our regulations and by law to grant the benefit." 5
The VA's doctrine of "reasonable doubt" contrasts sharply
with the allocation of the burden of proof in a civil case.86 The
28, 1979, at A5, col. 1 (VA granted benefits to veteran stating nuclear radiation a "probable
factor" in his development of cancer. The veteran was Orville Kelly, founder of the National
Association of Atomic Veterans, 1109 Franklin Street, Burlington, Iowa 52601).
82. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 321, 331, 341 (1976). It should be noted that an attorney who
represents a veteran with respect to a claim before the VA is limited to a fee of ten dollars.
Id. § 3404(c)(2). Many attorneys may not wish to work for such a nominal fee.
83. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d) (1979).
84. 45 Fed. Reg. 29,163 (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 49,091 (1979).
85. 1979 Hearings, supra note 2, at 210 (testimony of J. Charles Peckarsky, Director,
Compensation and Pension Service, Department of Veterans' Benefits, Veterans Adminis-
tration). Problems arise when there are little or no "facts" to balance. "Reasonable doubt,"
as explained in 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1979), means in part that "the claimant is required to
submit evidence sufficient to justify a belief in a fair and impartial mind that his claim is
well grounded." A lack of evidence thus would seem to work against a claimant.
86. See notes 116-38 & accompanying text infra.
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burden of proof encompasses both a burden of producing evidence
and a burden of persuasion.87 Both must be satisfied in order for
the party who has the burden of proof to prevail. The burden of
producing evidence is satisfied when the evidence is "[s]uch that a
reasonable man could draw from it the inference of the existence
of the particular fact to be proved." s8 Thus, an evidentiary void of
sufficient degree would prohibit the party who has the burden of
proof from satisfying the burden of producing evidence. Assuming
this first part of the burden of proof is met, the burden of persua-
sion must still be satisfied. This means in a civil case that the
party carrying the burden must show the existence of the con-
tested fact to be more probable than not.8 9 Therefore, a so-called
50-50 balance in the evidence results in a loss for the party who
carries the burden of proof.
The VA laws and regulations do not impose the burden of pro-
ducing evidence or the burden of persuasion upon the VA.90 Even
if the VA's doctrine of "reasonable doubt" did mean that the VA
carries the burden of persuasion, the burden of producing evidence
would still remain, as it does, with the claimant. Because of the
evidentiary void involved in these cases,91 the VA's high rate of
rejection for such claims92 is not surprising. The real issue in these
circumstances is which party shall bear the loss when there is an
evidentiary void. Under the VA's "reasonable doubt" doctrine the
claimant bears the loss. When the burden of proof is placed upon
the VA, the claimant prevails.
The VA does utilize presumptions of service connection relat-
ing to certain chronic diseases and disabilities.93 These presump-
87. E. CLEARY, McCoRhucK's HANDBOOK OF ThE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 336, at 783-84 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as CLEARY]. See F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5,
at 240-41 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as JAMES & HAZARD].
88. CLEARY, supra note 87, § 338, at 789. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 87, § 7.7, at
245-46.
89. CLEARY, supra note 87, § 339, at 794. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 87, § 7.6, at
243-45.
90. The "50-50" balancing referred to by a VA official, see note 85 & accompanying
text supra, would seem to indicate that the VA is assuming the burden of persuasion. But
this "50-50" language is absent from any laws or regulations relating to the VA's adjudica-
tory process.
91. See notes 40-44, 68-79 & accompanying text supra; note 117 & accompanying text
infra.
92. See note 81 & accompanying text supra.
93. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301(3), 312, 333, 337 (1976). Chronic diseases and disabilities cur-
rently subject to presumptive service connection are listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (1979).
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tions are of little benefit to the veterans exposed to radiation at
the atomic testings, because the presumptions apply only if the
disease becomes manifest within one year after separation from the
service.9" The latency period for most of the disorders alleged to be
radiation-induced is usually over a year. 5
Because of the difficulty in establishing causation in VA pro-
ceedings, some plaintiffs may find the possibility of judicial action
more promising. However, tort suits against the United States by
affected veterans and their dependents are difficult to bring. The
Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 e (FTCA) contains a general
waiver of governmental immunity,7 modified by several express
exceptions that retain immunity in certain cases.9 8 In 1950 the
United States Supreme Court in effect added another exception to
the FTCA in the case of Feres v. United States,9 stating that the
The VA has authority to add to this list. 38 U.S.C. § 301(3) (1976).
94. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(3) (1979).
95. In a related matter, Representative Thomas Daschle has introduced a bill to pro-
vide a presumption of service connection for the occurrence of certain diseases in Vietnam
veterans who were exposed to phenoxy herbicides contaminated by dioxins (agent orange).
H.R. 6377, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. H428-29 (daily ed. Jan. 30,
1980).
The VA has issued several documents setting forth its policies for evaluation of radia-
tion claims. See Rating Practices and Procedures; Disability; Ionizing Radiation Exposure,
44 FD. REG. 49,090 (1979); Development of Ionizing Radiation Exposure, M21-1, Change
245, § 22.05.1 (Sept. 10, 1979) (not published in the Federal Register); Joint Department of
Defense and Veterans Administration Memorandum of Understanding on Investigation of
Ionizing Radiation Claims from Veterans Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Test Participants
(June 15, 1979) (not published in the Federal Register). See also 45 FED. REG. 29,161 (1980)
(revised version of Rating Practices and Procedures; Disability; Ionizing Radiation Expo-
sure). However, a lawsuit filed against the VA alleged that the VA violated several public
notice, comment, and rulemaking requirements in issuing these documents. See Complaint,
supra note 80, at 10 (alleging violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (1976) and 38 C.F.R. §§ 1.12,
1.550-.559 (1979)). This allegation is especially serious in light of the fact that the VA's
claims decisions are not subject to judicial review. See 38 U.S.C. § 211 (1976).
96. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b)-(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412,
2671-2680 (1976). See generally L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AND JUDIcIAL REMEDIES (1980).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
98. Id. § 2680. The statute of limitations under the FTCA is two years. Id. § 2401(b).
The latency period for allegedly radiation-induced injuries should not pose a problem in
these cases. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 n.7 (1980) (as to medical mal-
practice claims under the FTCA, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff has discovered the injury or reasonably should have discovered it); Note, The Ap-
plication of the Statute of Limitations to Actions for Tortious Radiation Exposure: Garret
v. Raytheon Co., 21 ALA. L. REv. 509 (1980) (discussion of the discovery rule as applied to
radiation injury).
99. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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government is immune from suit "for injuries to servicemen where
the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service."100
Although the rationale underlying the Feres decision is ques-
tionable,10 1 it has been supported by the Court as recently as
1977.102 Feres was also relied upon in 1979 in Jaffee v. United
States,103 in which the Third Circuit sustained the government's
claim of immunity in a suit for damages brought by a veteran who
was present at an atomic bomb blast. However, the plaintiff vet-
eran in Jaffee also asked that the government be required to warn
all veterans who attended atomic blasts of the health risks that
now face them. The Third Circuit held that the government was
not immune from such a request."' In so holding, the court relied
upon a 1976 amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act that
partially waives the immunity of governmental agencies by al-
lowing "relief other than money damages."10 5 Jaffee was remanded
100. Id. at 146.
101. See 36 CONG. RPc. 12,014, 12,021 (1940); 3 K. DAVIs, ADhumsTRATrva LAW TREA-
rE §§ 25.04-.11 (1958); Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8
Rutrons L. Rv. 316 (1954); Note, Sovereign Immunity-FTCA-Injuries to Armed Ser-
vices Personnel, 18 CAsE W. RES. L. Rzv. 1788 (1967); Note, The Supreme Court and the
Tort Claims Act: End of an Enlightened Era?, 27 CLEv. ST. L. Rev. 267 (1978); Note,
Recovery for "Service-Incident" Injuries Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 50 COLuM. L.
REv. 827 (1950); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Status of Soldier as Claimant: Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), 35 CoR nu L.Q. 233 (1949); Note, Federal Tort Claims
Act As Applied to Military Personnel, 40 Ky. L. J. 438 (1952); Note, FTCA-Liability of
the Government for Service Connected Injuries to Members of the Armed Forces, 11 LA. L.
REv. 125 (1950); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to
FTCA Recovery?, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1099 (1979); Note, Jafee v. United States: Feres Doc-
trine at the Cliff's Edge?, 42 U. PA. L. REv. 115 (1980). Note, Military Rights Under the
FTCA, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rev. 455 (1969); Note, Rights of Servicemen Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 1 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 87 (1949); Note, Military Personnel and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 58 YAmE L.J. 615 (1949). See generally Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims
Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1 (1946); Note, The FTCA, 56 YALE L.J. 534
(1947).
102. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). See
also Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 647, 650 (1980) (per curiam) (implicit
approval of Stencel).
103. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). See Comment, 25 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. Rev. 377 (1979).
104. 592 F.2d at 718-20. But see New York Times, Aug. 2, 1979, at A12, col. 5 (district
court judge disapproving of government's proposed warning letter to veterans, saying letter
might encourage the veterans to ignore hazards rather than seek medical attention). See
also Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding district court's denial of the
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction compelling the government to warn atomic
veterans of possible genetic hazards facing them and their offspring).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). See Comment, Nuclear Accidents: Judicial Review of the
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to the district court where the plaintiff attempted to sue the indi-
vidual governmental officials responsible for his exposure to radia-
tion. The district court ruled that the protection of Feres extends
to those individuals and reluctantly dismissed the action."'
Another potential cause of action against the United States for
veterans or their dependents arises from the government's failure
to inform the veterans after they left the service of the health risks
they were facing. In many cases of cancer and other diseases, early
detection can improve the chances for survival. Significantly, the
governmental immunity provided by Feres has been held inappli-
cable when the government's negligence occurs after the veteran's
discharge from the military.10 7 Similarly, it has been alleged that
the government's failure to inform veterans after their discharge
that they have incurred increased health risks because of their ra-
diation exposure forms the basis for negligence that is unprotected
by Feres.105 A federal district court has recently found that such a
claim stated a cause of action in the case of a veteran's widow
whose husband participated in atomic maneuvers in 1953.109
NRC's Duty to Issue a Health Warning, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353 (1980).
106. Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632, 634-35 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, No. 79-1543
(3d Cir., filed Feb. 20, 1980) (petition for rehearing granted and panel decision vacated April
11, 1980) (rehearing by Third Circuit, en banc, held Nov. 17, 1980). See Note, Jaflee v.
United States: Feres Doctrine at the Cliff's Edge?, 42 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1980); see Note,
11 SETON HALL L. REv. 275 (1980).
107. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). Therefore, an allegedly negli-
gent postdischarge failure to warn of increased health risks resulting from the Army's covert
administration of LSD to a soldier on active duty was held to be beyond the protection of
Feres. See Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979). The result in
Thornwell should be contrasted with Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979),
where a claim for postdischarge failure to warn in another Army-LSD case was dismissed,
apparently because the Court believed that the government was not negligent. Other cases
also have involved an allegedly negligent postdischarge failure to warn. See Henning v.
United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (claim dis-
missed); Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (claim dismissed);
Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964), afl'd, 381 F.2d 627 (3d Cir.
1967) (claim allowed).
108. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 29-30, Broudy v. United States, No. 79-3829 (9th
Cir., filed June 18, 1980).
109. Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
Another legal avenue open to the atomic veterans grows out of the University of Cali-
fornia's involvement in the country's nuclear weapons program. Both the Los Alamos Scien-
tific Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have worked jointly with
the United States Government in major aspects of the program. Both labs have been, and
still are, comanaged by the United States Government and the University of California. See
Bradbury, The Los Alamos Laboratory, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC ScmTsTs, Nov., 1954, at
358; Day, The Nuclear Weapons Labs, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SciEmrIsTs, Apr., 1977, at
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If a plaintiff can establish a valid claim, there is reason to be-
lieve that factual causation would be a less difficult issue of proof
in the courts than it has been before the VA.
Burden of Proof
A cause of action for negligence entails five primary elements:
(1) a duty to act reasonably; (2) failure to so act; (3) factual causa-
tion; (4) legal causation; and (5) resulting injury.110 The first ele-
ment, duty, involves a legal obligation imposed by law based on
the relationship between the parties."1 The second element in-
volves unreasonable conduct.1 1 2 Factual causation entails the "mat-
21; Manley, The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
Apr., 1949, at 101; Schwartz, The Berkeley Controversy Over Nuclear Weapons, BULLETIN
OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept., 1978, at 20; New York Times, Nov. 18, 1978, at A22, col. 1;
id., July 31, 1977, § 4, at 18, col. 1, 3; id., July 19, 1977, at A14, col. 2; id., Nov. 15, 1975, at
A28, col. 1; id., June 19, 1971, at A30, col. 1; id., Jan. 8, 1971, at All, col. 1. Conceivably, the
University of California could be held liable as a joint tortfeasor based upon a concerted
action theory. Section 876 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977), entitled "Persons
Acting in Concert," states in part: "For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he .... (b) knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other
so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to
the third person." Bernard Witkin states that the Restatement's definition of "joint
tortfeasors" applies to "those who order, direct or permit others to do the act, and who give
assistance or encouragement." 4 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 30, at 2330
(8th ed. 1974). Dean Prosser states: "All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or
design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or
request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts
done for their benefit, are equally liable with him. Express agreement is not necessary, and
all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 292 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
see also Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 429-30 (1937).
Dean Prosser further notes that in establishing a cause of action based on concerted action,
"it is. . .essential that each particular defendant who is to be charged with responsibility
shall be proceeding tortiously, which is to say with intent to commit a tort, or with negli-
gence. One who innocently, and carefully, does an act which furthers the tortious purpose of
another is not acting in concert with him." PROSSER, supra, § 46, at 292 (footnotes omitted);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875, 877, 880 (1977). Two suits have been filed
against the University of California by survivors of two atomic veterans. See First Amended
Complaint, Sanders v. Livermore Labs, No. 535223-8 (Sup. Ct. of Cal. for Alameda County,
filed Aug. 7, 1980); Complaint for Plaintiff, Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, No. 535489-0 (Sup.
Ct. of Cal. for Alameda County, filed Aug. 6, 1980). See generally A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFOR-
NIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIALrr PRACTICE (1980).
110. See PROSSER, supra note 109, § 30, at 143.
111. Id. § 53, at 324.
112. Id. § 32, at 150. Proof of this element is sometimes aided by a type of circumstan-
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ter of what has in fact occurred." '1 s Legal causation in a particular
case essentially is a question of policy as to whether the law will
impose responsibility for the consequences that have occurred as a
result of the conduct. 14 Injury involves actual loss or damage to
the interests of a person.11 5
Should any of the veterans or their families claiming the right
to relief reach the trial stage, they will face considerable difficulty
in establishing the causal connection between their disability and
their exposure to nuclear radiation.116 The very nature of the radi-
ation injury makes proof of causation uncertain because: (1) the
injury from radiation exposure can take decades to manifest itself
clinically; (2) cancer and other diseases induced by radiation are
indistinguishable from identical diseases induced by other causes,
such as heredity or other environmental hazards; (3) direct evi-
dence of causation in individual cases is impossible; and (4) only
circumstantial evidence based upon expert opinion and statistical
tial evidence called res ipsa loquitur. See id. § 39, at 211-13. "Negligence, like any other fact,
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. This is evidence of one fact, or a set of facts,
from which the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred." Id.
(footnotes omitted). The set of facts from which negligence may be inferred include: "(1)
the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff." Id. § 39, at 214. Satisfaction of the first element would only
help prove that the plaintiff had been injured by the negligence of an unidentifiable party.
It is the second element that helps prove it was the defendant whose conduct was negligent.
See id. § 39, at 218-21. The second element, therefore, necessarily embodies the issue of
factual causation. This can lead to confusion between res ipsa loquitur and the entirely
different issue of shifting the burden of proof on factual causation. See Rabin v. Tumin, 36
Cal. 2d 654, 661-65, 226 P.2d 574, 578-81 (1951). "Only confusion can result ... if rules
designed to shift the burden of proof or the burden of going forward with the evidence are
treated as rules governing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence." Id. at 664, 226 P.2d at
580 (Traynor, J., dissenting and concurring). Inasmuch as res ipsa loquitur is merely a form
of circumstantial evidence, it may be confused with other uses of circumstantial evidence,
such as violation of a statute constituting circumstantial evidence of factual causation. See
note 132 & accompanying text infra. For two excellent discussions of res ipsa loquitur, see
Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4
LA. L. REv. 70 (1941); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 183
(1949).
113. PROSSER, supra note 109, § 41, at 237.
114. Id. § 42, at 244; id. § 41, at 237.
115. Id. § 30, at 143.
116. The need to prove a causal connection between radiation exposure and subse-
quent injury can be obviated. If the negligent conduct alleged is a postdischarge failure to
warn, see notes 107-09 & accompanying text supra, then a causal connection between the
injury and the failure to warn (not the exposure) must be shown.
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probabilities is available.11
The burden of proof' 18 on factual causation, as with the bur-
den of proof on other elements of the negligence cause of action,
generally is on the plaintiff.11 9 In certain limited circumstances,
however, the burden of proof on factual causation may be shifted
to the defendant. Courts have been willing to justify such a shift in
cases where an evidentiary void existed as to the causal connection
between a defendant's unreasonable conduct and an innocent
plaintiff's injury. In each case where the court allowed such a shift,
the plaintiff was in a position to show the elements of duty, breach,
and injury, but was unable to show the element of factual causa-
tion because of an evidentiary void. In each case, the plaintiff pro-
vided as much circumstantial evidence of factual causation as
fairly could be required under the circumstances. The courts then
allowed a shift in the burden of proof on factual causation such
that the defendants were required to show that their conduct did
not in fact cause the plaintiff's injuries. It is proposed that the
principles developed in these cases are applicable to the claims of
the veterans.
In Summers v. Tice, 2 ' two hunters simultaneously shot in the
direction of the plaintiff, resulting in the plaintiff's injury. Al-
though able to prove that both defendants acted unreasonably in
shooting, the plaintiff was unable to prove which defendant fired
the shot that hit him. The court recognized that both defendants
were negligent and that one of them did in fact cause the plaintiff's
injury. Recognizing in addition that the plaintiff was innocent, the
court shifted the burden of proof on factual causation to the defen-
117. See Radiation Protection Hearings, supra note 44, at 318-23 (statement of Irwin
D.J. Bross, Ph.D., Director of Biostatistics, Roswell Park Memorial Institute).
118. For a discussion of the burden of proof, see notes 86-89 & accompanying text
supra.
119. See PROSSER, supra note 109, § 41, at 241. For suits brought against the United
States under the FTCA, liability is assessed "in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1 (1962). See also FED. R. Evm. 302 (in federal civil cases, the burden of proof is
determined by state law).
120. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Set Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9
STAN. L. REV. 60, 82-85 (1956); Miller, Cases of Uncertain or Unknown Causation and Neg-
ligence: Relationship Analysis as a Real Alternative to Present Inadequate Concept, 16 U.
KAN. L. REv. 209, 210-12 (1968); Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implica-
tions on Rules of Liability and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769,
778-80 (1977); 37 GEO. L.J. 627 (1949); 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 412 (1950); 27 TEX. L. REV. 732
(1949).
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dants. 121 Each defendant was then required to produce evidence,
and show by a preponderance of such evidence, that he was not the
cause of the plaintiff's injury.
The decision in Summers reflects an appropriate policy choice
based upon principles of justice. Dean Prosser approved of the re-
sult in Summers, stating:
It seems a very desirable solution where negligence on the part of
both defendants is clear, and it is only the issue of causation
which is in doubt, so that the choice must be made between let-
ting the loss due to failure of proof fall upon the innocent plain-
tiff or the culpable defendants.1 22
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has also endorsed the de-
cision in Summers:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the
burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.2 8
The Reporter's comment explains that the reason for the rule "is
the injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers, who among them
have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to es-
cape liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the
resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of
them has caused the harm."'124
The principle underlying Summers was later applied in a case
that involved only a single defendant. Haft v. Lone Palm Hote12 5
involved the drowning of a father and son in a hotel swimming
pool. The defendant was held negligent as a matter of law because
of its failure to comply with statutory safety requirements requir-
ing the presence of a lifeguard and warning sign.1 26 There were no
121. 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
122. PROSSER, supra note 109, § 41, at 243. A similar statement has been made by
former Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court: "The Summers rule is based
on the policy that it is preferable to hold liable a negligent defendant who did not in fact
cause the injury than to deny an innocent plaintiff any remedy when it cannot be deter-
mined which of the defendants is responsible for the harm but it appears that one of them
was." Vasquez v. Alameda, 49 Cal. 2d 674, 682-83 n.2, 321 P.2d 1, 7 (1958) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
123. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
124. Id. § 433B, comment f.
125. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970). See also 12 Wm. & MARY L.
REV. 928 (1971).
126. 3 Cal. 3d at 763, 478 P.2d at 468, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
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witnesses to the drownings and the lack of evidence surrounding
the event made it unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to prove
that the defendant's unreasonable conduct was a factual cause of
the deaths. The court therefore shifted the burden of proof on fac-
tual causation to the defendant.1 27
The court noted a distinction that made the shifting of the
burden of proof in Haft even more desirable than in Summers. In
Summers, the absence of proof on causation, although a result of
the defendants' conduct, was not a consequence that was reasona-
bly foreseeable by the defendants. In Haft, the absence of proof
regarding causation was a result of the defendant's conduct, be-
cause that conduct "deprived the present plaintiffs of a means of
definitively establishing the facts leading to the drownings. '128 In
Haft, however, the court found that the lack of evidence was a
foreseeable result of the defendant's failure to provide a lifeguard.
The court thus deemed the defendant in Haft to be more " 'culpa-
bly' responsible" and more "at 'fault'" for the absence of proof
than were the defendants in Summers.29 The fact that the lack of
evidence was a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct is not
essential to the holding in Haft.130
The major question remaining unanswered is the degree to
which a plaintiff must establish a causal link between the defen-
dant's conduct and the injury before the burden shifts. The Haft
opinion spoke of shifting the burden of proof "when there is a sub-
stantial probability that a defendant's negligence was a cause of an
accident."' '1 Although this "substantial probability" may have ex-
127. Id. at 769-75, 478 P.2d at 473-77, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 753-57.
128. Id. at 771, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
129. Id. at 773-74, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756. Fault for the absence of proof
resulted not merely from having caused the absence, but also from the foreseeability of such
an absence.
130. See Note, A New Burden of Proof in Negligence Actions Involving Statutory
Violations?, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 650, 666-67 (1972). That this is not a requirement for shifting
the burden of proof is made clear in the recent case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 601, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 930, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138, 144, cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 285 (1980). See note 139 & accompanying text infra.
131. 3 Cal. 3d at 774 n.19, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756. One California appel-
late court has used this "substantial probability" language to deny a shift in the burden of
proof because it could not "say that there was a substantial probability that the defendants'
negligence caused the accident." Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6,
113 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (1974). This reading of Haft is incorrect, however, for it fails to take
into account other relevant language in the opinion. See notes 132-33 & accompanying text
infra.
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isted in the Haft situation," 2 it should not be interpreted to re-
quire of the plaintiff an evidentiary showing that cannot be met.
Naturally, the greater the evidentiary void, the less likely a "sub-
stantial probability" of causation could be established by the
plaintiff. A negligent defendant thus would be able to avoid a
shifting of the burden by ensuring a greater evidentiary void. The
rationale underlying Haft indicates that the plaintiff need only es-
tablish the causal relationship to a degree which is fair under the
particular circumstances. The court in Haft reasoned:
[P]laintiffs have gone as far as they possibly can under the cir-
cumstances in proving the requisite causal link between defen-
dants' negligence and the accidents. To require plaintiffs to estab-
lish "proximate causation" to a greater certainty than they have
in the instant case, would permit defendants to gain the advan-
tage of the lack of proof inherent in the lifeguardless situation
which they have created.133
Tfe recent case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories'" further
amplifies the principles underlying Summers"5 and Haft. In
132. It is likely that the court's use of the phrase reflected California law that allows
an inference of factual causation to arise when the negligence involves the breach of a statu-
tory duty, see 3 Cal. 3d at 765, 478 P.2d at 469-70, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50, and the particu-
lar circumstances of the Haft case in which the facts "strongly suggest" that causal connec-
tion. Id. at 772, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755. See Note, A New Burden of Proof in
Negligence Actions Involving Statutory Violations?, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 650, 667-68 (1972).
This use of circumstantial evidence to establish an inference of factual causation should not
be confused with res ipsa loquitur, which is a use of circumstantial evidence to establish an
inference of unreasonable conduct. See note 112 supra.
133. 3 Cal. 3d at 772, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755. The court's reference to
"defendants" rather than "defendant" is due to the joint ownership of the hotel. See id. at
761 n.1, 478 P.2d at 466, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 746. For purposes of causation analysis, they can
be considered as a single defendant as they all acted as a unit through the hotel.
134. See 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285
(1980). See also Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem,
94 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981).
135. The Sindell court noted that Summers relied on the earlier case of Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). 26 Cal. 3d at 599, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 136. In Ybarra, the California Supreme Court held that it was error to enter a
judgment of nonsuit against a plaintiff who, because he was unconscious during an opera-
tion, was unable to specify which of several medical personnel in attendance during his
period of unconsciousness were negligent. Ybarra is distinguishable from Summers, Haft,
and Sindell in that the plaintiff in Ybarra could not establish the negligence of any particu-
lar defendant. For insightful discussion of Ybarra, see Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal.
2d 290, 296, 188 P.2d 12, 15 (1947) (Traynor, J., dissenting); Adamson, Medical Malprac-
tice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MNN. L. Rav. 1043 (1962); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 643 (1950); Thode, Unconscious Patient: Who




Sindell the California Supreme Court not only shifted the burden
of proof, but also expressed a willingness to hold a defendant liable
when there is no substantial probability that the defendant's con-
duct was a cause of the plaintiff's injury. Sindell involved a suit
against the manufacturers of diethylstilbesterol (DES) for personal
injuries by a plaintiff whose mother ingested the drug during preg-
nancy. Alleging negligence and strict liability in the marketing,
promoting, and testing of the drug, the plaintiff was unable to
identify which of the approximately 200 manufacturers 8 actually
produced the DES ingested by her mother. The case did not in-
volve the causal issue of whether DES was in fact responsible for
the injuries, but instead concerned the causal issue of which of the
numerous defendants had supplied the DES in question. As to this
issue, the court allowed the burden of proof to be shifted to the
defendants.137
136. 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
137. Id. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. The court in Sindell
extended the principles underlying Summers to a factual situation that was not faced in
Summers because there were only two defendants involved in that case. It is unclear how
Summers would have been decided if there had been three defendants. If each one had fired
one shot, absent any other evidence, the probability of any individual defendant's being the
cause of the plaintiff's injury would have been 33'!3 %. Even with the burden of proof
shifted to the defendants, each could have overcome that burden by mathematically show-.
ing that it was more probable than not (66V %) that he or she was not the actual cause. The
two defendants in Summers could only show a 50% probability that they individually were
not the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Because a party with the burden of proof needs to
show more than a 50% probability under the preponderance of the evidence standard in
order to overcome that burden, neither defendant in Summers was able to overcome his
burden. Conceivably, in the hypothetical case involving three hunters, a court could hold all
defendants liable for that percentage of the damages corresponding to their individual
probabilities of having caused the whole injury.
It must be emphasized that the goal is to apportion liability for damages in a manner
that corresponds to the defendants' respective probabilities of having caused the injury. In
the absence of other evidence, apportionment of damages according to market share is the
fairest way to accomplish this goal. However, in a particular case, the appropriate market
share must be identified. For example, assume four manufacturers with these respective
market shares: A-45%, B-25%, C-20%, and D-10%. The output of these four manu-
facturers constitutes 100% of the market. But if it is determined by evidence unrelated to
market share that C could not have caused the injury, then the output of the remaining
manufacturers, A, B, and D, constitutes 100% of the market from which the injury-causing
drug could have come. This is the appropriate market for apportioning liability. The manu-
facturers' respective shares of this market are: A-56%, B-31%, and D-13%. By compar-
ison, where C is not excluded by evidence that it could not have caused the injury, but
becomes insolvent, C's output still constitutes a portion of the appropriate market because
the injury-causing drug could have come from C. Hence, the original market shares still
apply for apportionment of liability, because C's insolvency does not affect the respective
causal probabilities of A, B, and D as represented by their market shares. In such a case, the
March 19811
The court's opinion clarified several aspects of the principle
underlying Summers. First, it stated that a defendant need not
have superior knowledge of the cause of the plaintiff's injury as a
prerequisite for shifting the burden of proof.38 Second, the court
found that a defendant need not be at fault for the absence of evi-
dence before the burden of proof may be shifted." 9
percentage of recovery represented by C's market share would be uncollectable. A recent
commentator has failed to make these distinctions. See Note, Industry-Wide Liability and
Market Share Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REv. 423, 444-45 (1981).
Essentially, this is the approach adopted by the court in Sindell. The court held it
"reasonable in the present context to measure the likelihood that any of the defendants
supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold
by each of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of
the drug sold by all for that purpose." Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Thus, a defendant DES manufacturer whose share of the market was 10% would be liable
for 10% of the plaintiff's damages. Presumably, if a manufacturer could demonstrate with
evidence unrelated to market share that it was not a cause, it could exculpate itself. Excul-
patory evidence unrelated to market share could include, for example, proof that the pre-
scribing physician and pharmacist never used brand X, that brand X was not available at
the time in question, or that brand X was a tablet and the plaintiff's mother remembers
taking only capsules. See Note, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 994-95 (1978). This point is seemingly endorsed by the court in
Sindell. See 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Therefore, under
Sindell a defendant may be held proportionately liable even though he or she can demon-
strate mathematically that it is more probable than not that he or she did not cause the
plaintiff's injury. Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
The imposition of liability according to market share does more than simply shift the
burden of proof on factual causation. It changes the standard by which that burden must be
overcome. Usually proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to overcome the
burden in a civil case. See PROSSER, supra note 109, § 41, at 241. In the absence of other
evidence, that standard could be met easily by a defendant whose market share was less
than 50%; it would be more likely than not that such a defendant was not a cause. If no
manufacturer of DES had a market share greater than 49%, for example, then each manu-
facturer would be able to exonerate itself despite the shift in the burden of proof. Under
Sindell, proof by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not a cause of the plaintiff's
injury will not exculpate a manufacturer unless that evidence is unrelated to market share.
This constitutes not only a shift in the burden of proof, but also a change in the standard
required to overcome that burden. Although the court in Sindell did not discuss this point,
the authority of the California Supreme Court to effect such a change in the standard can
be found in CAL. EvID. CODE § 115 (West 1966), which states: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence." (Em-
phasis added)." 'Law' includes constitutional, statutory, and decisional law." Id. § 160 (em-
phasis added). See People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 314, 535 P.2d 352, 357, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488, 493 (1975).
138. 26 Cal. 3d at 600-02, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
139. The court stated: "Not do we conclude that the absence of evidence on this
subject is due to the fault of defendants." Id. at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
The court later stated: "[A]lthough the absence of such evidence is not attributable to the
defendants ... their conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many
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The evidentiary problems facing atomic veterans is most
closely analogous to the facts in Haft. In both situations, single
defendants engaged in unreasonable conduct from which injuries
to the innocent plaintiffs could have arisen. In Haft, failure to pro-
vide a lifeguard as required by law established the defendant's
negligence. Regarding the veterans, the government knew of the
hazards involved with radiation exposure, yet exposed non-
volunteers and misinformed them regarding those hazards. The
AEC delegated its responsibility for troop safety to the military,
which then authorized levels of radiation exposure in excess of
levels recommended by the AEC's medical division. The unreason-
able nature of the conduct is further established by the inadequate
dosimetry, protection, medical monitoring, and recordkeeping by
the government.
The similarity of the relationship between the atomic veterans
and the government and that between the parties in Haft is fur-
ther established because in both situations the lack of evidence
was a direct and foreseeable result of the unreasonable party's con-
duct. Although foreseeability is not a requirement for shifting the
burden of proof, the foreseeability of an evidentiary void does
serve to enhance the unreasonable quality of the government's
conduct and make it more equitable that the burden of proof be
shifted. In Haft, the court found that the absence of evidence on
causation was a direct and foreseeable result of the defendant's
negligent conduct in failing to provide a lifeguard. Two facets of
the government's conduct account for the foreseeability of an evi-
dentiary void in suits brought by veterans. First, a large amount of
information was available to the government when it exposed the
veterans to nuclear explosions. The scientific community of the
1950's knew enough about the nature of radiation to appreciate the
hazards involved with such exposure, including the latent health
risks and the difficulty of establishing causal connection between
radiation exposure and the diseases such exposure may induce.
The government knew or should have known all of this. With re-
years played a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof." Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at
936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. This latter comment by the court seems unclear, for if "their
conduct. . . played a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof," how can it be
said that "the absence of such evidence is not attributable to defendants"? More precisely,
the court is probably saying that the evidentiary void created by the defendants' conduct
was not a foreseeable result of that conduct. Thus defendants possess no fault for the evi-
dentiary void as did the defendant in Haft. See notes 129-30 & accompanying text supra.
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gard to the areas of uncertainty, conscious ignorance should have
dictated caution. Second, inadequate dosimetry, protection, medi-
cal monitoring, and recordkeeping by the government compounded
the magnitude of the evidentiary void facing the veterans. It is not
surprising that veterans who cannot prove the dosage of radiation
that they were exposed to, and who have been without proper
medical surveillance, are having great difficulty in establishing a
causal connection between their exposure to radiation and their
health problems. Because of these particular aspects of the govern-
ment's conduct and its general knowledge of radiation injury in the
1950's, the evidentiary problems facing the veterans and their fam-
ilies today were foreseeable. Therefore, unlike the defendants in
Summers and Sindell, but like the defendant in Haft, the govern-
ment is at fault for the evidentiary void in these cases.
Finally, the plaintiffs in both Haft and the atomic veteran liti-
gation have gone as far as fairly can be required in establishing
factual causation. Because no persons witnessed the drownings in
Haft, there was a lack of proof inherent in the situation created by
the defendant. To require more proof from the plaintiff would
have been unfair. The veterans face a similar evidentiary void. The
situation created by the government involved exposure to radia-
tion. This alone makes proof of factual causation extremely diffi-
cult. In addition, the inadequate dosimetry, protection, medical
monitoring, and recordkeeping that was done by the government
has created even larger problems of proof for the veterans. For
some veterans, the only evidence they will be able to provide is
their own assertion that they attended a nuclear blast, general
medical knowledge of radiation and its health effects, and evidence
of their own injury. To require them to establish factual causation
to a greater degree would allow the government to gain an advan-
tage from the evidentiary void inherent in the situation it created.
Conclusion
Many veterans who participated in military maneuvers in con-
junction with atmospheric nuclear tests are having difficulty in ob-
taining compensation for injuries that are allegedly radiation-in-
duced. The VA has denied the existence of such a causal
relationship, and the courts have not yet reached the issue of fac-
tual causation in any veteran's case.
The burden of proof on factual causation thus far has been
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placed on the veterans. Should courts reach the issue of factual
causation, the burden of proof can be shifted to the government.
This shift would be justified by several reasons. First the unreason-
able nature of the government's conduct, demonstrated by: (1) the
knowledge by the government at the time of its conduct of both
the pathological and genetic hazards of ionizing radiation; (2) the
AEC's delegation of its responsibility for troop safety to the DOD,
which then authorized levels of radiation exposure in excess of
levels recommended by the AEC's medical division; (3) the inade-
quacy of the DOD's dosimetry program, which has prevented as-
sessment of the true levels of exposure; (4) the inadequate protec-
tion given to the soldiers; (5) the nonvolunteer status of the
soldiers and the government's failure accurately to inform them of
the hazards involved; and (6) the government's failure to conduct
adequate medical monitoring of these soldiers and their offspring,
and the loss and destruction of many of these veterans' records.
Second, these veterans and their families are innocent of any
breach of duty to others in this matter. Third, the veterans have
gone as far as they fairly can be asked to go in proving the requi-
site causal relationship. Fourth, the evidentiary void that faces
them in this matter is a direct and foreseeable result of the govern-
ment's conduct.
For the above stated reasons, the policy rationale that under-
lies the decisions 140 in Summers, Haft, and Sindell should be ap-
plied in the cases of these veterans. A shift in the burden of proof,
however, will not guarantee recovery. The government can still at-
140. Courts in jurisdictions other than California have also shifted the burden of proof
on factual causation in certain cases. See, e.g., Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 967-
68 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378-80
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Greene v. Union Optical Center, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Mich. App.
1980); Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 300-02, 338 A.2d 1, 6-7 (1975); Hood v. Hagler, 606
P.2d 548, 553-54 (Okla. 1980).
Recently, a federal district court has had an opportunity to apply Summers, Haft, and
Sindell in a wrongful death action arising out of U.S. Army spraying of San Francisco with
bacteria in 1950. See Nevin v. United States, Civ. No. C-78-1713SC (N.D. Cal., filed May 20,
1981) (denying a shift in the burden of proof). Although the government's conduct was
found to have been reasonable, id. at 21, the court's analysis of California law contained
serious flaws. The court found that cases involving multiple defendants such as Summers
and Sindell were "inapposite" to a single-defendant case such as Nevin. Id. at 34. Such
reasoning, however, was not embraced by the California Supreme Court in Haft when it
expressly relied on Summers. See 3 Cal. 3d at 772-74, 478 P.2d at 475-77, 91 Cal. Rptr. at
755-57. In addition, the district court erroneously relied on the "substantial probability"
language of Haft, see Nevin, supra, at 35, without taking into account other relevant lan-
guage in that opinion. See notes 131-33 & accompanying text supra.
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tempt to disprove the causal link.141 Thus the proper resolution of
this matter may involve a compensation program that is outside of
traditional tort law.142 Amendments to the VA laws specifically
dealing with the atomic veterans have been introduced in Con-
gress. 148 Regardless of the type of remedy, however, the legal maze
that faces these veterans should not obscure the critical ethical
analysis that is always required in cases of human experimen-
tation.144
141. On proving a causal relation in radiation cases, see generally 17 Am. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 2d 575 (1966); STASON, EsTEP & PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW (1959); Estep, Radia-
tion Injuries and Statistics: The Need-for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH.
L. REV. 259 (1960); Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries from Radiation,
24 LA. L. REv. 1 (1963); Hutton, Evidentiary Problems in Proving Radiation Injury, 46
GEO. L.J. 52 (1957); Hutton, Workmen's Compensation and Radiation Injury, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 145 (1958); Keyes & Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes-The Low
Level Radiation Example, 56 IOWA L. REv. 531 (1971); O'Toole, Radiation, Causation, and
Compensation, 54 GEo. L.J. 751 (1966); Stason, Tort Liability for Radiation Injuries, 12
VAND. L. REV. 93 (1958); Comment, The Irradiated Plaintiff: Tort Recovery Outside Price-
Anderson, 6 ENvT'L LAW 859 (1976); Note, Radiation Injury: A Technical and Legal Sur-
vey, 6 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 171 (1957); Note, Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some
Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 414 (1974).
142. Congress has authorized compensation for residents of the Marshall Islands who
were exposed to radiation from a thermonuclear detonation at Bikini Atoll in 1954. See Act
of Oct. 15, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-134, 91 Stat. 1159; Act of Aug. 22, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-485,
78 Stat. 598. Recently, bills have been introduced to compensate the civilians who lived near
the Nevada Test Site. See H.R. 4766, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H5864 (daily ed.
July 12, 1979); S. Res. 1865, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S14,251-55 (daily ed. Oct.
9, 1979) (remarks of Senator Kennedy). For other compensation ideas, see INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION, FINAL REPORT (June, 1979)
(United States Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare publication); INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON COMPENSATION FOR RADIATION-RELATED ILLNESSES: PHASE I, REPORT (Feb. 1, 1980)
(United States Dep't of Justice publication); Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Com-
pensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARv. J. LEGis. 683
(1977).
143. See H.R. 872, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H116 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1981)
(Representative Henry Gonzales); H.R. 1564, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H349
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1981) (Representative Joseph Addabbo); H.R. 1733, 97th Cong., 1st Seas.,
127 CONG. REC. H412 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1981), reprinted in 127 CONG. REC. at E386 (daily
ed. Feb. 5, 1981) (Representative Norman Mineta); H.R. 1769, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127
CONG. REC. at H413 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1981) (Representative Fernand J. St. Germain).
144. See generally EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTs (P. Freund ed. 1970); Ex-
PERIMENTATION WITH HuMAN BEINGS (J. Katz ed. 1972); Ratnoff & Smith, Human Labora-
tory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 673 (1968).
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